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ADVERTISING AND QUALITY INVESTMENT DECISIONS IN SUPPLY 
CHAINS: A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS 
SUMMARY 
Nowadays, game theory has been used as an indispensible method in the analysis of 
decisions of the players in supply chains who have conflicting objectives. In a supply 
chain, suppliers, manufactures, retailers and customers are trying to maximize their 
profits. The players in the supply chain can cooperate or compete in accordance with 
their aims. This dissertation is an attempt to determine optimal policies of the supply 
chain members competing for a common pool of customers in a revenue 
management context under different supply chain structures by utilizing game 
theoretical approaches. This research seeks to add new approaches to the growing 
literature of supply chain competition by enlarging the existing literature in terms of 
contract parameters and supply chain structures. 
We consider a supply chain structure with two competitor upstream and two 
competitor downstream firms in the vertically related industries. This dissertation 
studies the competitive behavior of these multiple competing firms who produce 
substitutable products in supply chain management. We are aiming to choose the 
most profitable structure among three different supply chain structures by employing 
game theoretic approach under linear demand function. It is assumed that firms can 
supply all demand of the customers. 
In the first model, all the upstream and downstream firms are acting separately. The 
competing upstream firms invest in product quality and then set the wholesale price 
for the product simultaneously. The downstream firms then exert marketing 
investment to develop the market and at the last stage, they set the order quantities 
simultaneously.  
In model 2, two upstream firms merge and form a monopolistic upstream firm. This 
monopolistic firm invests in product quality followed by the wholesale price 
decisions for the two downstream firms. Then, the downstream firms set the 
marketing investment and order quantities respectively.  
Finally, in model 3, we construct a supply chain structure where upstream and 
downstream firms decide to merge and form a vertical integrated chain. Again, the 
competing vertical chains simultaneously invest in product quality and marketing 
investment and then choose the order quantity respectively.  
By utilizing linear demand functions, we introduce the optimal decisions regarding 
marketing and quality investment levels, order quantities and wholesale prices for 
these three models.  We derive the existence and uniqueness conditions for the Nash 
equilibriums and calculate the explicit Nash equilibrium point. After verifying the 
stability and existence of the optimal decisions for quantities, investments and 
wholesale prices that maximizes the expected profit of the entire supply chain, we 
conduct a comparative statics analysis for equilibrium solutions in order to see the 
impact of supply chain parameters on these solutions and on the profit of the firms.  
 xii
We compare three supply chain structures from the perspective of the upstream and 
downstream firms and the entire supply chain. Our analysis shows that the level of 
investments by the firms depends on the supply chain parameters and the level of 
substitutability of the products. Because of that reason, we examine effects of system 
parameters on the equilibrium levels. 
Our analysis reveals that merger decisions at different levels of channel have 
significant effects on contract parameters and profits of the downstream and 
upstream firms. There is no clear dominating preference on supply chain structure 
from the perspective of entire chain profit. For the high values of the substitutability 
level, vertical merging of upstream and downstream firms is more profitable; on the 
other hand, if the substitutability level is sufficiently low, horizontal merger of the 
upstream firms’ channel structure will be chosen. If the firms act separately in the 
market, this will always result a low profit for the firms. Therefore, the dominance of 
the supply chain structure depends on the substitutability level. In addition, in the 
vertical merger case, we have the highest quality and marketing investment 
decisions.  
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TEDARİK ZİNCİRLERİNDE KALİTE VE PAZARLAMA YATIRIMI 
KARARLARI: OYUN TEORİSİ YAKLAŞIMI 
ÖZET 
Günümüzde, oyun teorisi tedarik zincirinde yer alan ve farklı çıkarlara sahip olan 
şirketlerin kararlarının incelenmesinde kullanılan önemli bir araç haline gelmiştir. 
Üretici, tedarikçi, toptancı ve müşterilerin tedarik zinciri içindeki amaçları karlarını 
en çoklamaktır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, tedarik zincirinde yeralan şirketler işbirliği 
yapabilir ya da rekabet edebilirler. Bu çalışmada aynı pazarda yer alan ve aynı 
müşteri kitlesi için rekabet eden şirketlerin farklı tedarik zinciri modellerinde oyun 
teorisi yöntemi kullanılarak en uygun politikaları incelenmiştir. Bu çalışmayla, 
genişleyen tedarik zinciri literatürünü, var olan literatüre, anlaşma maddelerini 
genişletmek ve farklı kanal yapılarını incelenmek kaydıyla yeni bir yaklaşım 
getirmek amaçlanmaktadır. Şirketlerin gelen talebi tamamen karşıladıkları 
varsayımıyla hareket edilmiştir.   
Dikey iletişimde bulunan ve rekabet eden iki üst (upstream) ve iki alt (downstream) 
şirketin yer aldığı bir tedarik zinciri yapısı ele alınmıştır. Çalışmamızda, ikame ürün 
üreten şirketlerin birleşmeci ve rekabetçi davranışları tedarik zinciri yönetimi ve 
yatırım yönetimi çerçevelerinde incelenmiştir. Amacımız, belirli (deterministic) talep 
altında ikame ürünler için oyun teorisi yöntemini kullanarak üç farklı tedarik zinciri 
modeli arasından en karlı modeli belirlemektir. 
İlk modelde, tedarik zincirinde yer alan şirketler bağımsız olarak hareket 
etmektedirler. Bu modelde, tedarik zincirlerinde birbirleriyle rekabet eden üst 
şirketler eş anlı olarak öncelikle yapacakları kalite yatırımlarına daha sonra da alt 
şirketlere ürünü satarken verecekleri toptan fiyata karar verirler. Daha sonra, tedarik 
zincirinde yer alan alt şirketler, pazarı geliştirmek amacıyla pazarlama yatırımlarını 
belirlerler ve son olarak da alt şirketler tarafından sipariş miktarları belirlenir.  
İkinci modelde, tedarik zincirinde yer alan üst şirketler birleşerek tekelci bir şirket 
oluşturmaktadırlar. Bu modelde, tekelci üst şirket öncelikle yapacağı kalite 
yatırımına daha sonra da alt şirketlere ürünü satarken vereceği toptan fiyatlara karar 
verir. Toptan fiyat belirlendikten sonra, tedarik zincirinde yer alan alt şirketler, pazarı 
geliştirmek amacıyla pazarlama yatırımlarını belirlerler ve son olarak da alt şirketler 
tarafından sipariş miktarları belirlenir.  
Son olarak, üçüncü modelde, üst ve alt şirketlerin birleşerek bütünleşik bir zincir 
oluşturdukları yapı incelenmiştir. Aynı şekilde, tedarik zincirlerinde birbirleriyle 
rekabet eden zincirler eş anlı olarak öncelikle yapacakları kalite yatırımlarına karar 
verirler. Daha sonra, pazarı geliştirmek amacıyla pazarlama yatırımlarını belirlerler 
ve son olarak da sipariş miktarlarını seçerler. 
 xiv
Doğrusal talep fonksiyonu ve yatırımlar için ikinci dereceden maliyet fonksiyonları 
kullanılarak, en uygun pazarlama yatırımları, kalite yatırımları, sipariş miktarları ve 
toptan fiyatlar üç farklı tedarik zinciri yapısı için belirlenmiştir. Nash denge 
değerlerinin varlık ve teklik koşulları sağlanmıştır. Nash denge noktaları 
belirlenmiştir. Daha sonra, denge miktarları üzerinde denge statik analizi yapılarak, 
parametreler üzerinde oluşacak değişimlerden, denge değerlerinin nasıl etkileneceği 
incelenmiştir. Üç tedarik zinciri yapısı, tedarik zincirindeki üst ve alt şirketler ve 
zincirin bütünü açısından karşılaştırılmıştır. Çalışma sonuçları bize, elde edilen 
denge miktarlarının tedarik zinciri parametrelerine ve ürünlerin ikame gücüne bağlı 
olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu nedenle, sistem parametrelerinin denge miktarları 
üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. 
Çalışmamız gösteriyor ki, farklı tedarik zinciri seviyelerinde alınan işbirlikçi 
yaklaşım kararı kontrak parametrelerini ve üst ve alt şirketlerin karlılıklarını 
etkilemektedir. Farklı tedarik zinciri yapılarının farklı ikame seviyeleri için zincirin 
toplam karlılığı açısından birbirleri üzerinde üstünlüğü görülmemektedir. İkame 
gücünün yüksek olması durumunda üst ve alt şirketler arasında oluşacak dikey 
birleşmenin sistemin bütününün karlılığı açısından daha iyi sonuçlar verdiği 
bulunmuştur. Fakat ikame gücünün düşük olduğu durumlarda, üst şirketler arasındaki 
birleşmenin daha karlı olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Sistem açısından en düşük 
karlılığı şirketlerin ayrı ayrı hareket ettikleri birinci modelin verdiği görülmektedir. 
Bu nedenle farklı tedarik zincirlerinin birbirleri üzerindeki üstünlüğü ürünlerin ikame 
gücüne bağlıdır. Ek olarak, yatırım kararlarının ve sipariş miktarlarının tedarik 
zincirinde dikey birleşme durumunda en yüksek olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Purpose of the Study 
 
Increasing competition and demands from customers to deliver products faster and 
cheaper shapes the world we live in today. At the same time, the array and 
complexity of products in our economy has increased dramatically and that trend will 
clearly continue and even accelerate. 
A well designed and managed supply chain will enable a company to offer high 
levels of customer service and at the same time hold its inventories and cost of sales 
to levels lower than its competitors do. The efficiency of the entire supply chain greatly 
affects each company’s ability to prosper, so standards of performance evolve in these 
supply chains over time. Skilled companies in specific markets that learn to work together to 
achieve new levels of efficiency and cost savings will create supply chains that grow faster 
than other supply chains in their markets. 
The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of vertical and horizontal 
mergers in the supply chain and see the effects of the change in the contract 
parameters of quality and marketing investments. While studying on these subjects, 
game theory is used to provide a model of interactions between the firms competing 
in the same business in order to increase their market shares. In general, our aim is to 
maximize the firms’ profits in the supply chain by taking into account these conflicts 
of interests in terms of quality and marketing investment, order quantity choice and 
wholesale price decisions. The reason that we choose game theory is its eligibility to 
model these conflicts between the players, which also triggered the affinity of the 
most researchers in supply chain area. 
With the assist of Nash Equilibrium, we can easily find the main factors that might 
affect the profit of a firm. In general, our aim is to maximize a company’s profits by 
taking into account these conflicts of interests.  
This study will be helpful for the determination of the: 
• Merge decision of the supply chain members, 
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• Order quantities and wholesale prices, 
• Total budget for the brand name and quality investments. 
The firms in the supply chain are integrated either vertically or horizontally. Vertical 
mergers involve a manufacturer forming a joint venture with a distributor or a 
supplier. This brings a remarkable advantage in terms of competition for the recently 
formed company. This makes it hard for other companies to compete with the newly 
merged company because of the supply chain and cost advantages that the merger 
brings.  
The other type of merger is horizontal merger. This is a merger when two companies 
competing in the same market merge or join. Related to the market shares of the two 
companies, this type of merger can have either a very large outcome or little effect 
on the market. When two extremely small companies merge, the results of the 
merger are less visible. In the general economy, these smaller horizontal mergers are 
very common. If a small local convenient store were to horizontally merge with 
another convenient store, the effect of this merger on the market would be negligible. 
On the other hand, in a large horizontal merger, the results would be felt throughout 
the market and sometimes throughout the whole economy. 
In the upcoming sections, we will consider and deeply investigate vertical and 
horizontally merger effects between diversified logistic players. Upstream firms will 
be competing on 
• Quality investments, 
• Wholesale price 
Where downstreams will compete on  
• Local marketing expenditure, 
• Order quantity. 
In the thesis, we will examine the efficiency and effectiveness of manufacturer-
retailer transactions. We will put our basics to the studies of Gournani, Erkoç and 
Luo [1] and Z. Huang and S. X. Li [2] and broaden their model with regards to a 
system with two manufacturers and two retailers.  
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In this dissertation, we have three main parts. In the preceding part of the paper, a 
literature survey is presented in the area of competitive game theory, supply chain 
and game theory utilization in supply chain. We see that, the interest on the game 
theory and especially game theory on supply chain is very new, starting from 1950’s. 
The main papers on these subjects are presented in the following chapter. 
Then, in the third chapter, three different supply chain structure developed on game 
theory will be discussed deeply one by one. By these three structures, we consider 
separated chains, vertically and horizontally integrated chains in the aim of 
comparing these different structures. Under each model, a comparative statics is 
performed by taking into account specific conditions on second order and stability 
conditions. In the chapter four, we will compare the three models and analyze the 
impact of product differentiation and the exogenous variables on the equilibrium 
levels.  
In the last part, the conclusions derived from these models on the profit, investment 
decisions, prices, order quantities will be analyzed, and then some propositions will 
be given for the further works. 
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2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 Game Theory  
Game theory is a powerful tool for analyzing situations, which contain conflicts or 
cooperation between multiple agents and it has been used for interactive optimization 
problems. Game theory and game-theoretic models were first developed by John von 
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. There are different models in the game theory, 
which have a large application area especially in the economy, business, auctions, 
biology, politics and anthropology. Game Theory Models can be group as:  
2.1.1 Non-Cooperative Games 
In non-cooperative games, Strategies are chosen simultaneously by the players and 
they players take decisions according to the chosen strategies. It is supposed that the 
players take rational decisions. This model searches a rational expected result of the 
game in practice. The solution concept for these games was formally introduced by 
John Nash (1950). 
Nash Equilibrium 
Nash proposed in 1950 what came to be known as “Nash Equilibrium” as a way of 
extending game theoretic analysis to non-zero sum games. Nash equilibrium requires 
that each player’s strategy to be a payoff maximizing response to the strategies that 
he forecasts that his opponents will use, and further that each player’s forecast be 
correct. This is a natural generalization of the equilibrium studied in specific models 
by Cournot and Bertrand and it is starting point of most economic analysis.[3] 
Stackelberg Equilibrium 
Different from Nash Equilibrium in which all players make decision simultaneously, 
in Stackelberg game, one player makes decision before the others do rather then 
simultaneous decision. In a Stackelberg game, leader player makes a decision first 
and announces it, and then the other players, called followers, make their decisions. 
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Sequential Games 
In sequential games, there is a multi-player decision process in which each player 
makes a sequence of decisions. This model was first created by Heyman and Sobel in 
1984 [3]. Each player’s decision sequence influences the evolution of the process. 
However, the infinite repetition of Nash equilibrium of the one-period game 
comprises equilibrium for the sequential game.  
2.2 Supply Chain Management 
Supply chains encompass the companies and the business activities needed to design, 
make, deliver, and use a product or service.  These stakeholders in the supply chain 
are linked by a flow of materials, information, and funds. Therefore, we can define 
supply chain management as management of relationship between these chain 
members. The relationship is the result of material, information and money flow 
within the chain members. General supply chain frame can be drawn as in the Figure 
2.1 [4]:  
 
Figure 2.1: General Structure of the Supply Chain  
The importance of information flow and uncertainty on the demand and on other 
factors in the market has made it increasingly important for companies to understand 
the structure of their supply chains and their roles in order to have a competitive 
advantage in the markets. People have started to understand the term “supply chain 
management” in the late 1980s and this term was begun to be used widely in the 
1990s. SCM is defined by T. John [3] as: 
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“The systemic, strategic coordination of the traditional business functions 
and the tactics across these business functions within a particular 
company and across businesses within the supply chain, for the purposes 
of improving the long-term performance of the individual companies and 
the supply chain as a whole.” 
Firms in SC focus on operation management, marketing problems, inventory control, 
production or pricing competition, capacity and quality investment, advertising and 
new product development. While supply chain players are performing these 
activities, they individually have different objectives, strategies and needs that are 
conflicting. Because SC consists of several decentralized firms and operational 
decisions of these different entities influence each other’s profit, and thus the profit 
of the whole supply chain. These conflicting requirements can be covered only when 
they are seen all together, it means under complete information, which is not always 
possible. Therefore, in supply chain, firms choose to compete or co-operate with the 
other chain members in order to maximize their profits. For that reason, cooperation 
and competition are the most current and important topics arising in SCM. At this 
point Game Theory appears in the determination of these conflicting strategies at in 
an optimal manner. Because of the increasing interest on the applications of the 
Game Theory in SC, there are many papers on this subject. Now, we will analyze 
these papers.   
2.3 Game Theory in Supply Chain 
During the last decade, we realize the increasing interest of the academicians and 
practitioners in the supply chain management and the interactions between the 
players in the supply chain. While dealing with problems in the management of 
supply chain and the interactions of the players, game theory has became the most 
effective tool. Therefore, we can find many publications focusing on the game 
theoretical applications in different supply chain management (SCM) areas.   
The different parties (retailers, manufacturers, suppliers, distributors) in a supply 
chain are called as players in game theory. The profit functions of the supply chain 
stakeholders are called his/her payoff functions. A player’s best response is his/her 
best strategy given the strategies of all other players. The concept of “Nash 
equilibrium” is used to represent a solution to a game in which all players make 
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decisions simultaneously. A set of strategies constitutes Nash equilibrium if each 
player’s strategy maximizes his/her own payoff function given the strategies of other 
players [6].  
Production planning, capacity investment and allocation, inventory decisions on how 
much and where to produce, procure and store, shipment schedules, and joint pricing 
and inventory decisions, quality and marketing investment decisions have a strategic 
impact on operational decisions of the various players in supply chains. Game theory 
is a natural choice while determining these strategies.  
One of the most important reviews that are written on the game theoretical 
applications is the study of Cachon and Netessine [6], in which they explain in 
details the game theory on supply chain and group the games according to their 
applications. According to the review, four main game theoretical techniques used in 
SCM are 1. non-cooperative games, 2. cooperative games, 3. dynamic games, and 4. 
games with asymmetric/incomplete information. Some of the game theoretical 
techniques do not have any application in SCM such as mixed strategies, zero-sum 
games and games in extensive form. In our analysis, we benefit from his paper while 
using non-cooperative for the simultaneous and sequential decision making of 
multiple players in different supply chain structures under complete information. 
Now we will analyze the game theory applications according to the application areas 
in SCM. 
2.3.1 Inventory Games 
One of the first papers on inventory management is written by Parlian [7]. In this 
paper, competition on the order quantities between two retailers who sell 
substitutable products is analyzed by solving Nash equilibriums. Parian [7] showed 
that cooperation between two players result an increase the retailers’ profits. Avsar 
and Baykal-Gursoy [8] extended Parian's model to the infinite horizon and lost-sales 
case and examined a two-person nonzero-sum stochastic game under the discounted 
payoff criterion. 
Cachon and Zipkin [9] modeled a two-stage supply chain with stationary stochastic 
demand for a supplier and a retailer in a competitive and cooperative setting. After, 
Cachon [10] extended the above models to analyze the competitive and cooperative 
inventory issue in a two-echelon supply chain with one-supplier and n retailers.  
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In addition, Hongwei Wang [11] analyzed non-cooperative behavior in a two-
echelon inventory decentralized supply chain like Cachon, for a one supplier and n 
retailer’s case.  
Cachon [12] studied the “sharing of the manufacturer’s forecast information with the 
suppliers”. Manufacturer produces a single product with a stochastic demand and a 
supplier that is the sole source for a critical component. This paper demonstrates that 
it is always in the interest of a manufacturer with a high demand forecast to share her 
forecast with the supplier.  
Another paper of Cachon [13] studies revenue-sharing contracts in a general supply 
chain model with revenues determined by each retailer’s purchase quantity and price. 
The model demonstrates that revenue sharing coordinates a supply chain with a 
single retailer and arbitrarily allocates the supply chain’s profit.  
2.3.2 Production and Pricing Competition 
Companies and entire supply chains can influence demand by price. This point is 
first realized by Bertrand and Cournot in the 19th century before game theory was 
formalized in the 1940s. After the deepening on game theory, many papers focused 
on the vertical competition on price/quantity between a manufacturer and a retailer or 
horizontal competition between two manufacturers or two retailers [14]. Some of the 
main literatures in the pricing strategies among competitive firms are mentioned 
above: 
Bernstein and Federgruen [15] considered a two-echelon supply chain where a 
supplier distributes a single product to N competing retailers, each of which facing a 
deterministic demand rate dependent on all retailers' prices. Alternatively, the price 
each retailer can charge for his/her product depends on the sales volumes targeted by 
all of the retailers. The difference of this paper is the demand structure and supply 
chain centralized structure. Then, the authors investigated the systems under Cournot 
and Bertrand competition, respectively. They also consider the Stackelberg game 
when the supplier acts like the leader and chooses the wholesale prices so as to 
maximize his/her own profits.  
Lin Li, Jia-zhen HU [16] considers the price and order competition in a two-echelon 
supply chain with a leader upstream manufacturer who sells a single product to a 
follower downstream duopolistic retailers. It is assumed that demand is price 
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sensitive. The problem is analyzed under the Stackelberg structure. As a leader, 
manufacturer announces her wholesale price first and a common-replenishment 
schedule to competitive retailers after duopolistic retailers sets their sales prices and 
associated order policies.  
In the model of Tsay and Agrawal in [17], two retailers who sell substitutable 
products compete on both price and customer service. The focus is on investigating 
the impact of competition between retailers on prices, service levels and profits, and 
identifying coordination mechanisms with a common manufacturer in a centralized 
scenario. They explore the interaction between capacity, prices and delivery times for 
the firms. 
Cachon and Lariviere [18] considered a simple supply-chain contract in which a 
manufacturer sells to a retailer facing a newsvendor problem and they try to set the 
wholesale price. They arrive to the result that the manufacturer’s profit and sales 
quantity increase with market size, but the resulting wholesale price depends on how 
the market grows. 
In addition to the papers mentioned above, McGuire and Staelin [19] consider a 
supply chain with two identical retailers, with linear demand functions and linear 
procurement costs, who compete on the basis of price. They assume the two retailers 
are supplied by two manufacturers who may be vertically integrated with their 
retailer. Petruzzi and Data [20] examine an extension of the newsvendor problem in 
which stocking quantity and selling price are set simultaneously. They provide a 
comprehensive review that synthesizes the then existing results for the single-period 
problem and develop a number of additional results. Sudhir [21] analyzes the 
competitive pricing behavior in the U.S. auto market. He uses a random utility 
approach, which is dependent on prices, to estimate competitive interactions among 
firms in markets with many competing products. 
2.3.3 Advertising Games and Product Quality Games 
Marketing effort that is spent in order to increase demand is also an important 
coordination mechanism that can occur between the upstream and downstream firms. 
It can be divided into brand name investments and local advertizing expenditures. 
For example, Kotler [22] noted that marketing efforts can be spent in several ways 
such as advertising, sales promotion, sales force and marketing research expenditure.  
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One of recent study on the advertising game is published by Z. Huang and S. X. Li 
[18] which we have also talked in the production and pricing part. Three co-op 
advertising models, which are based on two non-cooperative games and one 
cooperative game, are discussed in this study. They try to determine the local 
advertising and brand name advertising decisions. According to this study, system 
profit is maximized in a cooperative game where the local advertising expenditure is 
shared between manufacturers and retailers. Our research differs from Huang and Li 
study which only examines the marketing investment by analyzing quality and 
marking investment effect together in a competitive way. 
Li et al. [23] investigated manufacturer–retailer coordination as a cooperative 
advertising in supply chain problem. They are analyzing the impact of marketing 
effort on the manufacturers and retailers relationships. In the model, seller produces a 
product and wholesales it to the buyer, who then retails the product to the consumer. 
The production rate of the seller is assumed to be linearly related to the market 
demand rate, while demand is sensitive to selling price and marketing expenditure. 
They highlighted the impact of investment in brand name, local advertising and 
sharing policy in three models under a cooperative regime in this supply chain 
structure. They concluded that seller agrees to share a fraction of the total local 
advertising expenditure with the buyer. 
M. Esmaeili et al. [24] proposed several seller–buyer supply chain models. They took 
into account cost factors as well as elements of competition and cooperation between 
upstream and downstream firms. It is assumed that unit marketing expenditure and 
unit price charged by the buyer influence the demand of the product being sold. The 
non-cooperative game is based on two Stackelberg strategy solutions, Seller-
Stackelberg and Buyer-Stackelberg. Pareto efficient solutions are provided for the 
cooperative game model. Different models’ results are compared. With the increase 
in marketing activity impact on demand, the wholesale price, selling price and 
marketing expenditure increase while unit demanded decreases. In our model, in 
addition to this research, we analyze the marketing impact of the competitor 
downstream firm on demand of the firm on this study. Our results are compatible 
with the results of Esmaeilli et al.   
There are very early empirical works concerning the marketing activities as the study 
of Dhalla [25]. One of the recent analyses is Huang and Li [2] which we are basing 
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our analysis on. They have studied the relationships between sales promotions, 
advertising, and pricing, as well as how these factors influence manufacturers, 
retailers, and consumers. These studies promote the need for our analytical 
developments by establishing the practical importance of policies, which determine 
these factors. 
In addition to their manufacturer’s own marketing investments, they can also 
subsidize the retailer’s sales promotions. Two-tier advertising is a typical example of 
this type of joint promotion effort between a manufacturer and a retailer in which the 
retailer initiates and runs a local advertisement and the manufacturer pays part of the 
cost. We see this kind of strategies constructed in the studies of Li et al. [23]; Xie and 
Ai [26]. 
Joseph G. Szmerekovsky, Jiang Zhang [27] studied a single product two-tier 
advertising model consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. In this paper, 
demand is a nonlinear function of the retailer’s local advertising level, the 
manufacturer’s national brand name investment level, and the retail price charged to 
the consumers. The power of the manufactures and retailer in the system is taken into 
account while they are deciding on the wholesale price, advertising efforts, and 
reimbursement rate for local advertising at the retailer outlet. One important focus of 
the research is analyzing the effects of pricing decisions on a system with two-tier 
advertising. They assumed a decentralized system where the manufacturer is the 
leader and the retailer is the follower. The results show that subsidizing local 
advertising is not an effective contract approach for improving system profits. 
Increasing the amount of advertising by the manufacturer and a lower retail price at 
the outlet is more profitable.  
Besides price, service also influences the customers’ preferences and their 
purchasing decisions, and hence market demand. A few papers regarded service as a 
new dimension for competition. On of the example of this kind of research is Iyer 
[28]. In this research, they studied multi-echelon coordination under price and non-
price competition. 
Gilbert and Cvsa [29] emphasized on the retailer’s innovation stimulated by the 
supplier’s strategic commitment to wholesale price in their study. This case can be 
seen as service improvement, because the aim of both is to enhance market demand. 
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One of the recent papers on the service improvement was written by Dumrongsiri et 
al [30]. They studied the price–service competition between the two channels of the 
manufacturer given the wholesale prices of suppliers. The main result that was 
reached in this paper is that an increase of the retailer’s service quality may increase 
the manufacturer’s profit.  
For service-level selection, Ishii [31] established a Cournot duopoly competition 
model where risk-averse firms choose optimal R&D levels under demand 
uncertainty. Ishii [31] studied the R&D quantity competition between two firms 
whereas we consider the price, quality, marketing investment and price competition 
between two supply chains. He assumed that two firms play an R&D competition in 
the first stage and a quantity competition in the second stage; however, in our model, 
we have four stages where at the first stage, two upstream firms simultaneously 
determine their quality investment levels and then wholesale price. After, 
downstream firms choose the marketing investment levels and order quantity in our 
model. In our model, we have two upstream and two downstream firms. 
Cohen and Whang [32] developed a Stackelberg game model for a manufacturer and 
a service operator. In this sequential game framework, there is vertical competition 
for the provision of service quality in a channel consisting of a leader manufacturer 
and an independent follower service operator.  
Tiaojun et al. [33] added uncertainty in demand and considered a channel 
competition between two supply chains. In the supply chains, it is assumed that there 
are one risk-neutral supplier and one risk-averse retailer, where two retailers compete 
in retail price and service. For the members in the same chain, the supplier is a leader 
and the retailer is a follower.  They concluded that:  the higher the service investment 
efficiency of one retailer, the lower the optimal retail price and service level of his 
rival will be. 
2.3.4 Channel Coordination in Supply Chain by Game Theory 
The expected profit of the total SC will be most profitable if and only if all decisions 
with access to all available information required taking decisions. Therefore, the 
channel coordination is very important. There are mainly two types of channel 
coordination. If all the information is available, this is often associated with 
centralized control of the SC. In reality, we do not come across with this situation. 
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Because many SCs are under decentralized control, which causes to decision-making 
conflicts between the chain members. Under centralized control, a system manager 
needs to know how to design a mechanism to optimize the performance of the whole 
supply chain. In order to increase the total profit of a decentralized supply chain and 
improve the performance of the players, one strategy is to form contracts among 
players by modifying their payoffs. Some contracts provide a means to bring the total 
profit resulting from decentralized control to the centralized optimal profit. This is 
referred to as channel coordination as explained by Leng and Parlar in [14]. 
Trivedi [34] paid attention to channel structure where retailers compete to sell 
multiple brands at the same time. This channel competition is analyzed for three 
different channel structures. The manufacturers distribute their differentiated 
products in a non-cooperative way with Nash and Stackleberg equilibriums. By this 
paper, they reach to the result that the competitive effect on both manufacturer and 
retailer influence the profit and prices.  
Cachon and Zipkin [35] investigate a two-stage serial supply chain with stationary 
stochastic demand and fixed transportation time over an infinite horizon. They 
analyze two models; first is competitive model and second is obtained by minimizing 
total supply chain costs. However, Klastorin et al. [36] analyzed the behavior of the 
buyers under price discounts in a two-echelon distribution system. The supplier 
offers a price discount to any retailer who places an order. They showed that this 
policy can lead to more efficient supply chains under certain conditions, and 
proposed the optimal price discount amount in the decentralized supply chain.  
2.3.5 Mergers in Supply Chain 
In the paper [37] horizontal mergers is analyzed in an upstream sectors of vertically 
related industries. They investigate the impact of different contract types under 
bargaining. If the players are bargaining on the contract parameters under bargaining 
game, the players in the supply chain choose to stay separated. On the other hand, if 
the downstream firms are powerful, they prefer to merge.  
Horn and Wolinsky [38] and Ziss [39] study upstream horizontal mergers. According 
to the results in these papers, downstream firms merge when they compete in the 
final good market. This result is obtained in Horn and Wolinsky’s [38] paper, if the 
firms bargain over wholesale price contracts. However, Ziss [39] instead obtains the 
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same result in a setting with two-part tariff contracts, by assuming that an upstream 
monopolist announces the contract terms to all the downstream firms. 
On vertical contracting, Papers of O'Brien and Shaffer [40] and Rey and Vergé [41] 
deal with the contracting problem of an upstream monopolist that trades with 
multiple competing downstream firms. These papers, similarly to ours, identify the 
monopolist's commitment problem. In our Model II, we have a monopolized 
upstream market and multiple contract parameters. Thus, in contrast to our paper, 
they ignore the impact of different contracts parameters. In our model, we determine 
wholesale price, quality investment, marketing investment and order quantity in the 
contracts.  
Like in our model, de Fontenay and Gans [42] considers both upstream competition 
and monopoly. In particular, two upstream firms that trade with two competing 
downstream firms are either separately or commonly owned. De Fontenay and Gans 
[42] examine the impact of the upstream market structure on the incentives and 
consequences of vertical integration. The authors allow for multilateral negotiations 
among the vertically related firms by using non-cooperative bargaining game, in 
which a key assumption is that agents renegotiate their contract terms after a 
breakdown in other negotiations occurs.  
Arya et al. [43] studied outsourcing from vertically integrated retail competitor by 
utilizing Bertrand, Cournot Fashion vertically related industries when bargaining is 
present and contract types are endogenous. They demonstrated that standard 
conclusions about price and quantity competition can be altered when the production 
of inputs is outsourced to retail rivals. They also found that when the supplier of an 
input is also a retail rival, the vertically integrated producer may set a higher input 
price under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. 
2.3.6 Real World Examples of the Supply Chain Mergers 
2.3.6.1 Vertical Mergers 
Vertical mergers involve a manufacturer forming a joint venture with a distributor or 
a supplier. This brings a remarkable advantage in terms of competition for the 
recently formed company. It makes it hard for other companies to compete with the 
newly merged company because of the supply chain and cost advantages that the 
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merger brings. Vertical mergers can be best understood from examining real world 
deals. 
In the coming paragraphs I will try to examine a current vertical merger and dated 
one. I will analyze the main factors behind these mergers and possible outcomes. 
Example 1:  
As the raw material costs continuing to rocket in the steel industry in the recent 
years, companies look ways to increase their upstream self-sufficiency especially in 
primary raw materials. ArcelorMittal, Luxembourg based world’s number one steel 
manufacturer, continued its aggressive growth strategies by acquiring “London 
Mining PLC”, a raw material miner in Brazil. The transaction was took place in 20th 
of August 2008 by a total amount of 810 Million USD. This was the 3rd move in 
2008 by ArcelorMittal in the direction of vertical integration with iron ore miners or 
suppliers in order to decrease its operating costs; strengthen its competitive 
advantage and improve its supply chain management in developing countries such as 
Brazil.  Previously, ArcelorMittal’s agreed to buy a 49% stake in Brazilian iron ore 
and manganese miner Mineracao Piramide Participacoes Ltd. Additionally, 
ArcelorMittal bought the majority shares of a coke plant from Koppers Inc. for 160 
Million USD. The price of coking coal, which is used in steel production, hit record 
highs in 2008. Moreover, ArcelorMittal has also plans to invest highly in coalmines 
in Russia and Africa. These deals in 2008 made ArcelorMittal’s position even 
stronger in the exceedingly competitive steel market. ArcelorMittal also moved 
forward to diminish its operational costs, guarantee the security of raw material 
supply; maintain and develop the existing markets. 
Example 2: 
In 1995, world’s biggest media and entertainment group was formed after the merger 
of Time Warner Inc. (TW) and Turner Broadcasting System Inc. (TBS). Time 
Warner, a major cable operator, and Turner Broadcasting System, a key broadcaster, 
agreed to merge under one single entity. The merger cost more than $7.5 billion; 
Timer Warner agreed to buy 82% of Turner Broadcasting System Inc. Main idea 
behind this operation was to decrease the operating costs of both companies by $600 
million per year and to create synergy between two companies which own powerful 
brands names from CNN to Warner Brothers. The FTC investigated the merger 
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thoroughly if it would allow Time Warner to monopolize much of the programming 
on television at that time. Finally, the FTC concurred to allow the merger but 
stipulated that the merger could not act in the interests of anti-competitiveness to the 
point at which the public good was harmed. 
2.3.6.2 Horizontal Mergers 
Another type of merger is horizontal merger. This is a merger when two companies 
competing in the same market merge or join. Related to the market shares of the two 
companies, this type of merger can have either a very large outcome or little effect 
on the market. When two extremely small companies merge, the results of the 
merger are less visible. In the general economy, these smaller horizontal mergers are 
very common. If a small local convenient store were to horizontally merge with 
another convenient store, the effect of this merger on the market would be negligible. 
On the other hand, in a large horizontal merger, the results would be felt throughout 
the market and sometimes throughout the whole economy. 
It is common belief that large horizontal mergers are often perceived as 
anticompetitive. If one company holding fifteen percent of the market share 
combines with another company also holding fifteen percent of the market share, 
newly formed company’s market share will then increase to thirty percent. This large 
horizontal merger has now given the new company an unfair market advantage over 
its competitors. 
In the following section, I will provide some real economy examples of horizontal 
mergers and seek to find major reasons behind these transactions. Again, one of my 
examples will stand for the present and the other one will represent the past. 
Example 1:  
Energy field is one of the most important sectors in the global industry. In order to 
create economies of scale and be competitive in the international markets merger is 
an inevitable truth. This September a major transaction occurred in the European 
energy market. French energy giant EDF finally agreed to buy British Energy in a 
£12.4 billion deal. This would supplement British Government’s plans for a new 
generation of nuclear power stations to be built all over the country. Before this 
transaction, 36% of British Energy’s shares were held by the British Government, the 
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transaction was happened in 2002 in order to rescue the firm. After finalizing the 
deal and getting approval from the major shareholders, EDF will be in a prime 
position to develop the UK's nuclear power industry. The deal, which won the 
approval of the French and British governments, hands over British Energy’s eight 
nuclear plants to EDF. Currently, British Energy runs eight UK nuclear sites with 
adjacent land on which additional reactors could be built. With this move, EDF will 
strengthen its position to be the world’s largest nuclear plant operator with presently 
working 58 reactors in France. The takeover brings more French nuclear know-how 
to Britain, which has been looking to vary its energy mix. 
Example 2: 
In May 1998, Chrysler Corporation, United States 3rd biggest automaker, and 
German automaker Daimler-Benz agreed on a deal that formed DaimlerChrysler. 
This transaction believed to reshape the auto industry in many ways. The transaction 
was built on the fact that the deal would be a merger of two equals and that the two 
companies made a perfect match. The deal cost nearly 35 $ Billion for Daimler 
which was a bailout plan to rescue Chrysler from bankruptcy. There were major 
benefits of the transaction for both sides. Combining the German luxury carmaker 
with the pioneer of middle-class minivans not only would bring together makers of 
two different classes of autos, but also significantly widen the global reach of both 
companies. Chrysler would get greater way in to the European market, something it 
has sought after, while Daimler would gain a bigger foothold in the American 
market, where it has been working to increase its sales for a long time. Additionally, 
both companies have an opportunity to cut costs, which is a priority in the automaker 
industry that has not been able to raise its selling prices. Major obstacle behind the 
transaction was if the two different cultures can coexist at the same time. America 
auto market is the biggest market of the world with a very slow growth rate; 
therefore, Chrysler has to look for foreign markets, which Daimler would provide. 
On the other hand, Daimler is only generating 1% of its revenues from the American 
market. Similarly, Chrysler sold most of its vehicles in the United States whereas 
minority outside the States. Therefore, the transaction believed to help both on the 
revenue side and on the cost side of the two companies. 
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3. MODELS 
3.1 Objectives 
In this dissertation, we analyze different supply chain structures for two competitor 
upstream and two competitor downstream firms in the vertically related industries. 
Our aim is to study the competitive behavior of these multiple competing firms 
producing substitutable products by utilizing Cournot and Bertrand Models in Game 
Theory. We will try to find out the most profitable model among three different 
supply chain structures while deciding on the contract parameters. Supply chain 
players will compete on the following areas: 
• Quality investments, 
• Local marketing expenditure, 
• Quantity, 
• Wholesale price 
Our model is similar to Huang and Li’s [2] model. We extend their model to a case 
with two manufacturers and two retailers. We analyze the strategic behavior of 
manufacturers and retailers and try to understand their advertising and quality 
investment decisions.  
Throughout our study, the downstream firms, labeled D (downstream), procure 
intermediate products from different upstream firms, labeled U (upstream). Upstream 
firms produce at a constant marginal cost c. The intermediate goods sold by 
downstream firms 1 and 2 are assumed to be substitutable products. We also assume 
that the intermediate product manufacturers will spend on the technology (quality 
investment) in order to improve their product, process qualities and their marketing 
activities and on the other side, the final product manufacturers spend on their 
current markets by increasing their selling efforts to develop their businesses. 
We choose to use Cournot, Bertrand models and Nash Equilibrium in our analysis. 
These models help us to understand the background of wide variety of decisions. 
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Using Nash Equilibrium, we can easily find the main factors that might affect the 
profit of a firm and the equilibrium levels. This representation also provides us a 
model of interactions between the firms competing in the same business in order to 
increase their market shares at different consumer and market segments. In the 
Cournot model the firms’ action is to set their optimum outputs. On the other hand, 
in Bertrand model, the firms are trying to determine their selling prices that 
maximize their potential operating profits.  
We examine and discuss the relations between system parameters and the incentives 
in designing the supply contact structure. The timing of the price commitment 
decisions is essential in supply chains and can influence the investment decision as 
firms may not risk high investments in innovations due to the fear of opportunism by 
the other firm in setting a high price and losing market shares. 
In the previous studies on this subject, Gurgani, H., Erkoç, M. and Luo, Y. [1] 
investigated 3 different models to discuss the optimal configuration from 
manufacturer and supplier’s perspective. They analyze the effect of timing of the 
suppliers and manufacturers decisions. In our first model, decision order of the 
upstream and downstream firms’ are similar to Gurgani, H., Erkoç, M. and Luo, Y.’s 
[1] Model 1. But we analyzed this model with two upstream and two downstream 
firms. They showed that the quality investment and marketing investment parameters 
have negative effects on profit of manufacturers and suppliers which is similar to the 
results in our model with two upstream and two downstream firms.  
In the following part, we will analyze the structure of the market and the assumptions 
taken in our study.  
3.2 Market Structure  
We consider a two tier intra industry model consisting of two upstream input 
producer firms and two downstream output producer firms showed as Ui and Di 
where i= 1, 2. We suppose that there is one to one vertical relation between the 
upstream firms and downstream firms. The upstream firms produce homogenous 
goods to be consumed in the same market. It is presumed that each firm has different 
production technology. Our downstream market has a linear duopoly with 
differentated products. We assume that the market structure is symmetric and there 
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should be symmetry of the outputs of the competing firms. Furthermore, in all stages 
and models, we work with the games of complete information, i.e., the players’ 
strategies and payoffs are common knowledge to all players. 
In the model, we assumed that the production technology is in such a way that one 
unit of labor and one unit of the intermediate goods is needed to produce one unit of 
the final product. 
We choose to produce a linear inverse demand function that the downstream firms 
face as follows: 
ijijii ke-eqq-p µβδγα ++−=                  (3.1) 
Here, qi and qj represent the output levels of downstream firms Di and Dj 
respectively.  pi is the price of the output of  the downstream firm i.  Each firm takes 
other firm’s output level decision when deciding on its own output level. “γ” 
represents the substitution level of the products of the two downstream firms. If γ is 
high, it means downstream firms sells highly substitutable products. If γ =0, demands 
of the two downstream firms become independent. Other factors that have effects on 
price and demand are marketing activity level of the firms. ei and ej show the effect 
of marketing activities of the downstream firms on demand. We realize that, while ei 
has a positive effect on demand, the other downstream firm’s marketing effort ej has 
an inverse influence on demand and on price of the product of downstream firm i. On 
the other hand, ki shows the quality investment effect of the upstream firm i on 
demand. While, marketing and quality investments improve the competitiveness of 
one firm, it may reduce the profits of the rival firm at the same time.  
We suppose that every upstream firm faces a constant marginal cost of production c 
with 0 < c < α. Here α indicates the market size. 
We analyze three different scenarios. In the first case where there is no merger, each 
upstream-downstream pair decides over the contract terms of quantity, price, 
marketing and quality investments. Upstream firms compete in wholesale price and 
downstream firms compete in the final goods market in quantity. In the second case, 
upstream firm acts as a monopolist and interacts with the two competing downstream 
firms simultaneously and separately over the contract terms. Whereas, the 
downstream firms compete in the final good market. In the third case, downstream 
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and upstream firms merge vertically. In this case, two vertical chains compete as a 
whole chain in the final goods market in quantity. They react as two firms competing 
for the same market and downstream and upstream firms cooperate between each 
other.  
Upstream and downstream firms first decide on whether or not they will merge and 
then they determine the terms of contract. Therefore, we analyze the impact of 
vertical and horizontal merging on the profit functions, investment decisions, order 
quantity and wholesale prices of the firms in the following sections. We will 
investigate different merging decisions and the effect of these decisions on the 
payoffs of the supply chain members. During the model construction, we will use S 
for separated upstream and downstream firms and UM for horizontal merged 
u8pstream firms and VM for vertical merged upstream and downstream firms. 
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3.3 Model I-Competition in Supply Chain 
This model investigates a non-cooperative solution between upstream and 
downstream firms. If the upstream firms stay separate, we see two vertical chains in 
the market, which includes Ui and Di pairs. We constructed a supply chain where 
each of the upstream firms is selling their products only to one specific downstream 
firm. Downstream firms compete with each other in a Cournot fashion. Both 
upstream and downstream firms wish to maximize their profits. In order to find the 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, the problem is solved with backwards induction 
method.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
We have the following profit functions for each downstream and upstream firm:  
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Inverse demand function pi in the profit function is indicated in the equation (3.1). In 
this inverse demand function, the parameters are carrying the following meanings: 
Upstream Firm 1 
chooses k1 
Upstream Firm 2 
chooses k2 
Upstream Firm 1 
chooses w1 
Upstream Firm 2 
chooses w2 
Downstream Firm 1 
chooses e1 
Downstream Firm 2 
chooses e2 
Downstream Firm 1 
chooses q1 
Downstream Firm 2 
chooses q2 
Figure 3.1: Competition in Supply Chain Case 
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µ: impact of quality investment on demand 
δ: impact of upstream firm own marketing investment on demand 
β: impact of competitor upstream firm’s marketing investment on demand
 
In the profit functions, downstream firms have two types of cost. First one is 
wholesale price that downstream firms pay to the upstream firms. The other one is 
the cost of selling effort (Sales and Marketing Expenditures). We used the convex 
cost of selling effort and quality investment while modeling the decreasing return on 
investment to influence the demand as in the study of Gurnani, Erkoc and Luo [1]. 
The quadratic form of these investment cost functions reflects the diminishing 
returns to investments. This type of cost function has common usage in the 
marketing literature like in the study of Lal [44].  
On the other hand, upstream firms has also two types of cost, one is cost of 
production of one unit shown by ci proportional to quality investment and the other 
one is investment for quality improvement efforts, which may include more up to 
date, technologic, fast, reliable and flexible equipments, software packages, 
organizational trainings, more skilled labor, etc. Quality investments have an 
influence on the demand potential also. Quality level k effects the total expected cost, 
first on the fixed costs and then on the variable costs as we see in the equation below. 
Variable cost is taken as c(1+νki) where ν can be smaller or greater than zero 
including the decline in the production cost due to the improvement in quality. 
We will analyze the optimal decisions of upstream and downstream firms through 
four different variables. So, the game will consist of four-stages between downstream 
and upstream firms in which there will be simultaneous decisions. At the first stage 
of our model, upstream firms determine the quality investment level simultaneously 
and separately and then upstream firms determine the wholesale price again 
simultaneously with the other upstream firm in stage two. After determination of 
wholesale price, downstream firms decide to start marketing investments in the third 
stage. The last stage is the decision stage of the output level in the market by the 
downstream firms knowing quality investment, wholesale price and marketing 
investment levels. Now we are going to analyze these stages one by one with 
backwards induction method. 
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3.3.1 Stage 4: Downstream Firms Determine the Output Levels 
At the fourth stage of the game, each downstream firm determines their output level 
taking the other firm’s output level as given. Therefore, the equilibrium quantities 
that are found at this stage are the function of marketing investment level, wholesale 
price and quality investments level.  
We see that the downstream firms’ profit function is concave in q. Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium quantities are found by maximizing the profit functions of the 
downstream firms and solving the first order conditions, and then we obtain the 
following equilibrium Cournot quantities: 
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In order to maintain the concavity and prevent negative selling quantity, we assume 
that 0)(-4 2 ≠+ γ . It means 2≠γ  and 2−≠γ . 
We observe in the following equations that second order conditions are directly 
satisfied: 
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Since the profit functions of downstream firms are continuous and concave in qi and 
qj, the first-order conditions provide the profit maximizing level of quantities. The 
uniqueness and the stability of the equilibrium can be established through Index 
theory approach in Cachon and Netessine [5]. They used this method while testing 
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the stability of the simultaneous decisions on quality investment of a supplier and 
marketing investment of a buyer. In our model, we have the same situation because; 
two upstream firms decide on quantity levels that they will sell in the market 
simultaneously. As a result, we will analyze the following condition while testing the 
stability condition at the same time: 
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The stability condition for the first stage is verified, if the inequality (3.8) is satisfied, 
it means if,  
 -2<γ<2.                     (3.9) 
This condition is already satisfied because we assumed that 0<γ<1. 
It means that qi and qj carried out by the first order conditions are unique Nash 
Equilibriums. Since this condition is assumed for concavity, the equilibrium is 
unique.   
3.3.1.1 Comparative static analyses on the outcomes of stage 4: 
From the equations (3.4) and (3.4), we derive that the quantity chosen by 
downstream 1 changes by 
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in response to an increase in β. It means the impact of competitor firm’s marketing 
investment on demand. On the other hand, it changes by equation (3.11) in reply to 
an increase in δ, impact of its own marketing investment on demand. 
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From these equations, we can conclude that, effect of an increase in the demand 
parameter of marketing investments δ and β of the competing downstream firms on 
the quantity decisions depends on the substitutability of the products and the 
marketing investment decisions of its own and the competitor. We can state that the 
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quantity decision of the downstream firm i decrease, if the impact of marketing 
investment of the competitor firm on demand increases. Because, we know that ei 
and ej are positive and γ is between 0 and 1. Therefore, equation (3.10) is negative 
and equation (3.11) is positive which demonstrates that impacts of β and δ are 
opposite.  
Similarly, from equation (3.5), the quantity produced by downstream i increase by:  
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as an answer to an increase in µ, quality investment impact on demand. It means that 
when upstream firm i’s quality investment impact, µ, on demand increases, 
downstream firm I increases the quantity decision. Because, we know that ki and kj 
are positive and γ is between 0 and 1. 
Because of the complexity of the derivations, we will conduct the comparative 
statistics analysis for the other exogenous variables with the help of graphics in the 
comparative statistics part of Model I. 
 
 
3.3.2 Stage 3: Downstream Firms Determine Marketing Investment 
At the third stage of the game, each downstream firm determines their marketing 
investment levels taking the other firm’s marketing investment decision as given.  
We substitute the expressions of Siq  disposed by the equations (3.4) and ( 3.5) above 
into the downstream firms’ profit functions and we obtain the new profit functions 
regarding wholesale prices, quality investment and marketing investment levels, as 
follows: 
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After maximizing the profit functions of the downstream firms by solving the first 
order conditions according to marketing investment levels of the competing 
downstream firms, we obtain the following reaction functions: 
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Once solving these equations simultaneously, we find the equilibrium marketing 
effort levels that maximize the profit of downstream firms as follows: 
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ηγ
δβγ
ηγηδβγγδβδβγ
ηγγβδγβ
ηγδβγδ
ηγγα
δβδβγα
)4(
)2--2(
))4()2)(4(4)()2(4(
))(-4-4-(2
))(-4-2-(
))(2(-2
)()2-(-2A
2
23222222
22
22
2
+−=
=
+−+−+−−−−=
+=
+=
++=
+=
G
F
E
D
C
B
   (3.18)
 
In order to assure the concavity of the marketing investment reaction function and 
not to have negative marketing investment level, we require that  
0≠E                    (3.19) 
We see that second order conditions for the marketing investment level of the 
downstream firms are equal to: 
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We assume that the equation in (3.20) is smaller then 0. It means: 
ηγ
δβγ p22
2
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)2+(- 2                (3.21) 
Under this condition, we can state that the downstream firms’ profit functions are 
concave in ei and ej and the first-order conditions provide the profit maximizing level 
of marketing investments. 
While testing the stability of the profit functions in terms of marketing investments, 
we use the Index Theory Approach in Cachon and Netessine’s paper [6] as in the 
Stage 4:  
DiijDjjiDiiiDjjj eeeeeeee Π∂Π∂>Π∂Π∂               (3.22) 
After applying this stability condition, we reach the result in the equation (3.23): 
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We can confirm that there is a unique Nash Equilibrium for ei and ej by verifying the 
condition (3.23) above that demonstrated the one to one relation between the best 
responses. It means that if the best response mapping is one to one then there can be 
at most one fixed point of the mapping. 
If we impute the ei and ej in the optimum quantities that have been found in stage 4, 
we find that optimum quantity decision which is symmetric for the downstream firms 
is: 
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In order to ensure concavity and the cases of negative quantities, we require the same 
condition as for ei: 
0≠E                    (3.26) 
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By replacing ei with the optimum marketing investment level expression Sie  in the 
profit functions of downstream firms, we obtain it in terms of quality and wholesale 
price decisions of the upstream firms.  
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After substituting the equilibrium quantity and marketing investment levels of the 
competing downstream firms into the inverse demand function, it takes the following 
form: 
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3.3.2.1 Comparative static analysis on the outcomes of stage 3  
The impact of the quality investment parameter on the marketing investment decision 
is shown in the equation
 
(3.29): 
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We can affirm that the numerator and denominator of the equation is positive from 
the second order and stability conditions, therefore, if the upstream firm i quality 
investment becomes more effective, downstream firm i increases the marketing 
investment level. This shows us that the quality investment parameter of demand µ 
has a positive impact on marketing investment decision. We can conlude that the 
downstream firms spend more money on marketing investment, if the effectiveness 
of the quality investment on demand of the upstream firms increases.  
Because of the complexity of the derivations, we will conduct the comparative 
statistics analysis for the other exogenous variables with the help of graphics in the 
comparative statistics part of Model I.  
3.3.3 Stage 2: Upstream Firms Determine Wholesale Price 
At the second stage of the game, upstream firms decides on the wholesale prices. As 
we use the backwards induction while finding the Nash equilibrium values, we take 
the wholesale price decsion of other upstream firm as given. The output levels and 
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the marketing investment levels of the downstream firms will be chosen in the third 
and forth stages according to the upstream firm’s decision on wholesale price and 
quality investment levels. 
We suppose that the upstream firms are in the same market and they determine 
wholesale prices simultaneously. We also assume that each upstream firm interacts 
with one downstream firm and upstream firms produce substitutable input products 
to the downstream firms. Two downstream firms are trying to fix their wholesale 
prices. Therefore, we can call this equilibrium as “Bertrand Equilibrium”. 
We define the profit function of the upstream firms as:  
2
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Now, let us substitute the downstream quantity functions Siq  and 
S
jq  that we have 
derived in the equations (3.24) and (3.25), into the profit functions of upstream firms. 
Then we obtain restructured profit functions of upstream firms in terms of wi, wj, ki, 
kj and the other constants as follow: 
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Maximizing the profit functions of the competing upstream firms with respect to 
wholesale prices, we obtain the following reaction functions in the equations (3.32) 
and (3.33) of the firms:
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After solving these equations simultaneously, we find the equilibrium wholesale 
price contract levels that maximize the profit of upstream firms as follows: 
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The objective functions UiΠ  and UjΠ  are quadratic and concave in wholesale prices. 
In order to assure the concavity of the wholesale price reaction function and not to 
have negative wholesale prices, we require that: 
0* ≠E  and 0* ≠F    (3.37) 
33 
 
Using the second-order conditions, we assume that profit function is concave in 
wholesale price level (wi and wj). We see the second order conditions for the 
wholesale price below: 
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As long as the condition (3.38) is satisfied, the profit function will be concave in wi 
and wj and the first-order conditions provide the profit maximizing level of 
marketing investments. 
While testing the stability of the wholesale price decisions of the upstream firms, 
using Index Theory Approach, we reach the following condition in the equation 
(3.39): 
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To prove that the equilibrium level of wholesale price is unique, it is sufficient to 
assure the inequality in the equation (3.39). By assuring this stability condition, the 
existence of a unique equilibrium level of wholesale price is established. 
Finally, we find the optimum quantities, marketing investment levels and profits of 
downstream and upstream firms by substituting the equilibrium level of wholesale 
price. Please see Appendix of the Mathematica results for more detailed expression 
of equilibrium profit, wholesale price, quantity, marketing investment level and 
inverse demand functions of Stage 2. 
3.3.3.1 Comparative static analysis on the outcomes of stage 2  
The analysis for the second stage shows that the coefficient ρ , cost parameter of the 
quality investments on the wholesale price of the upstream firm, doesn’t have any 
influence on the wholesale price that the upstream firms chooses, but the coefficient 
ν , which corresponds to the production cost effect  of quality investment may 
increase the whole sale prices. Because, 
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With the light of these findings, we can say that, production cost has a positive 
impact on the wholesale prices; it means that if the production cost increases, 
upstream firms increase the wholesale prices, which is an expected result. Because of 
the complexity of the result, we will demonstrate this result numerically. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Impact of ν on the wholesale price  
(α=50, β=0.51, c=10, γ=0.8,η=0.4, ρ=2.5, δ=0.7, µ=1, ki=10, kj=10) 
Graphic in the Figure 3.2 shows us that the wholesale price is changing linearly with 
ν and if the production cost impact of the quality is positive, then the wholesale price 
will increase. This means, if the upstream firms’s quality investment impact on the 
production cost ν increases, the upstream firms will charge more wholesale price to 
the downstream firm.   
Because of the complexity of the derivations, we will conduct the comparative 
statistics analysis for the other exogenous variables with the help of graphics in the 
comparative statistics part of Model I.  
3.3.4 Stage 1: Upstream Firms Determine Quality Investment Levels 
At the last stage of the game, the upstream firms determine their quality investment 
levels taking the other firm’s quality investment level as given. The quality level of 
the products is very important while competing in the market with substitutable 
products. Upstream firms determine their investment in terms of technology, 
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equipment, labor, trainings, etc. simultaneously. They are trying to be competitive in 
the market by taking drastic decisions for quality investment levels in an aggressive 
environment. We use the best responses for the wholesale price decision of the 
upstream firm, output levels and the marketing investment levels decisions of the 
downstream firms, which have been solved in the previous stages. 
We restructure the profit function of the upstream firms by substituting the 
expression of wholesale price wi and wj that we have calculated in the equation 
(3.34) and (3.35) and we obtain: 
2
))1((
2ρν iiSiSiUi kkcwq −+−=Π
       …… 
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After maximizing the profit functions of the upstream firms by solving the first order 
conditions according to quality investment ki of the competing upstream firms, we 
derive the reaction functions of the firms for the quality investment levels.  
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We solved the reaction functions for ki and kj simultaneously to obtain Nash 
equilibrium quality investment levels that maximize the profit of upstream firms. The 
equilibrium level of quality investment could not be obtained because of the 
complexity of the equations. To arrive to an equilibrium level, we impute 
consecutively the following values for production cost, market size and the impact of 
quality investment on production cost: α=50, c=10, ν=0. The equilibrium levels of 
quality investment of the upstream firms are available in the Appendix of the 
Mathematica Results. 
Consequently, we impute the equilibrium level of the quality investment in the profit 
functions of upstream and downstream firms:  
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In order to maintain the concavity of the reaction function of the quality investment 
and not to have negative quality investment level, we require that the numerator of 
the expression of the quality investment should be different from zero. 
Using the second-order conditions, we verify that the quality investment level 
obtained maximizes the profits of the upstream firms. Thus, the profit function is 
concave in wholesale price level (wi and wj). We have the following second order 
conditions for quality investments: 
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By assuring negativity of the second order condition, we verify that the profit 
function is concave in ki and kj and the first-order conditions provide the profit 
maximizing level of quality investments. 
While testing the stability of the profit functions in terms of quality investments, 
once more we use the Index Theory Approach Cachon and Netessine [6] and test the 
condition below: 
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If this condition is satisfied, we can say that there is a unique Nash Equilibrium for ki 
and kj. After applying this stability condition, we reach the condition stated at (3.49): 
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(3.50) 
This method proves the stability of the equilibrium values by verifying that the effect 
of the quality investment decision on the concerning firm is higher for the own firm 
then the effect of the quality investment decision of the counter upstream firm. 
After these explanations, now we can find the optimum levels of equilibrium 
quantities, marketing investments and wholesale prices by substituting the 
equilibrium values of ki and kj into the expressions obtained previously and we have 
our final results in terms of exogenous variables. Due to deep density of the 
expressions, the final equilibrium decisions could not be written here. Therefore, it is 
stated in the Appendix section; please refer to Appendix of the Mathematica Results 
for the detailed expressions of these functions. As a result, the formal framework and 
infrastructure of our analysis for Model 1 is completed. 
3.3.5 Conditions on Model I Parameters 
Because of the complexity of the equilibrium analysis, we will precede using 
numerical values for the parameters satisfying the second order conditions and 
stability conditions of each stage. We assigned certain values to the exogenous 
variables by taking into account the following conditions.  
α > c; 
0 < γ < 1;         
         
(3.51) 
β < δ 
The values assigned for market size, production cost are indicated in the equation 
(3.52) above. We neglige the variable cost impact of the quality investment on profit, 
so we assign 0 for ν in all the models. 
α=50, ν=0, c=10                 (3.52) 
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Accordingly, we reach the following intervals for the exogenous variables of what 
we want to analyze the impact on the profit of the firms: 
η > 0.25510204082 
If η =0.4,  ρ >  2.15 
0.30246< δ <0.8812        
         
(3.53) 
0 < µ < 2.001 
0.5 < β < 2.12616 
3.3.6 Comparative Statics of Model I 
This section discusses several implication of the results derived from the equilibrium 
levels of the Model I. We analyze the impact of the exogenous variables on the 
endogenous variables. First-degree derivatives of optimum levels of the profit 
functions, qi, ei, wi and ki with respect to parameters show the effect of changes of 
these exogenous variables on the equilibrium levels. We analyze the sign of these 
expressions in the intervals where second order and stability conditions are hold. Due 
to the complexity of the equilibrium analysis with respect to the exogeneous 
variables, we use graphical analysis, which gives us very strong evidences supporting 
the results given in the following propositions.  
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3.3.6.1 Derivative of  Si
S
i
S
i
S
i
s
Di
S
Ui qkew ,,,,,ΠΠ  with respect to γ, δ, µ, ρ, β and η 
The table below presents the comparative statics analysis of the Model I for the 
decisions of the upstream and downstream firms on quality investment, marketing 
investment, wholesale price and quantity.  
Table 3.1: Impact of the exogenous variables on the equilibrium decisions 
 Exogenous Variables  
γ δ µ Ρ β η 
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 qi 
<0.45 
- 
>0.45 
+ 
<0.3 
- 
>0.3 
+ 
+ + <1.43 
- 
>1.43 
+ 
- 
ei 
<0.53 
- 
>0.53 
+ 
+  + + - - 
wi + 
<0.57 
- 
>0.57 
+ 
+ - <0.95 
- 
>0.95 
+ 
+ 
ki + 
<0.3 
- 
>0.3 
+ 
+ - <1.43 
- 
>1.43 
+ 
- 
ΠD 
<0.37 
- 
>0.37 
+ 
<0.37 
- 
>0.37 
+ 
+ - <0.37 
- 
>0.37 
+ 
- 
ΠU + 
<0.35 
- 
>0.35 
+ 
+ - <1.3 
- 
>1.3 
+ 
- 
The Table (3.1) was filled according to the sign of the derivation of the equilibrium 
values of the endogenous variables in the rows, which are determined in the system 
with respect to the endogenous variables shown in the columns. As it can be seen in 
the Table 3.1, sign of the certain derivatives of the endogenous variables change with 
the values of the parameters. Those critical values are indicated in the related cells.  
From the table above, we can conclude that all the endogenous variables changes 
positively with the substitution level under the condition that the substitutability is 
greater than 0.53. If the degree of differentiation is very high (γ is low), order 
quantity, marketing investment and downstream firm’s profit influence negatievely. 
This shows that if the products of the competing firms are not substitutable, firms 
decrease their marketing investments. Due to the decrease in the marketing 
investments and order quantities, which are the downstream firm’s decisions, 
downstream firm’s profit decreases. As a result, if a company has a competitor who 
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produce nearly homogenous products, upstream and downstream firms will increase 
their profits.  
Due to any improvement in the marketing investment effect on quantity (δ), all the 
equilibrium decision as quantity, marketing investment, quality investment and 
wholesale price will increase if  δ>0.57. But if the impact of the marketing 
investment on demand is lower than <0.3, except marketing investment, upstream 
and downstream firms are decreasing their decisions and as a consequence, their 
profts are decreasing. However, downsteam firms increase their marketing 
investments, whatever the impact of this marketing investment on demand.   
Another conclusion derived from the table (3.1) is that the quality investment impact 
on demand has a positive influence on all the endogenous variables.  
If we analyze the fix cost impact of marketing investment η, we conduct that except 
wholesale price, all the equilibrium values and profits decrease with an increase in 
effectiveness of the marketing investment on profit. It means when the negative 
impact of the marketing investment on profit is high, downstream firms decrease 
their marketing investments, quantity decisions and upstream firms decrease their 
quality investment decisions. The profits of the firms are also influenced negatively 
from the increase of this impact. The reason of the increase in the wholesale price 
can be to prevent the hign decrease of the profit of upstream firms by increasing the 
wholesale price. 
While quality parameter that shows the profit function impact of the quality 
investment ρ has positive effect on marketing investment decision and quantity 
decision, it has a negative effect on wholesale price and quality investment level. It 
means when the impact of the quality investment on profit is very high, firms 
decrease their quality investment decisions and invests more in marketing. 
Effectiveness of the competitor’s marketing investment on demand has a negative 
impact on the downstream firms’ marketing investment decision. If it is high, 
downstream firms decrease their marketing investments. Also, β has a negative 
impact on all the endogenous variables for its low values. 
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3.4 Model II-Horizontal Merge of Upstream Firms 
This model investigates the results of mergers between upstream firms. We analyze 
the change of upstream horizontal merged firm’s decisions on quality and wholesale 
price decisons as a result how the downstream firms’s decisions are influenced from 
this merging. Therefore, we will find the equilibrium decisions and compare them 
with the Model I. In this model, we structure a market having a merged upstream 
firm U and two separate downstream firms Di and Dj. The downstream and upstream 
firms aim at maximizing their profits while competing on the contract parameters. 
We suppose that neither Di nor Dj has an alternative trading partner. Other 
assumption is that each unit of downstream firms’ output requires exactly one unit of 
the input from upstream merger. Our downstream market has a linear duopoly with 
differentated products. We use backwards induction method to in order to find the 
sub-game perfect NE, for investments, prices and the quantities that the firms will 
decide on in the competing market.  
We can figure the structure of the supply chain for the Model II as in the Figure 
(3.3). In this Figure, you will see which firm gives which decision at what time: 
 
 Figure 3.3: Separate Downstream and Merged Upstream Firms 
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The only difference of that model from Model I is that “There is only one upstream 
firm who decides on quality investment level k and the wholesale prices wi and wj”. 
So, the profit function of downstream firms is the same as Model I, but in the inverse 
demand function and upstream firm’s profit function, we don’t have “i” indice for 
“k”. Since the upstream firms sells to both of the downstream firms, upstream firm 
will have a bigger profit function in Model II than Model I. We have the following 
profit functions for each downstream and upstream firm:  
2
e -q )w-(p 
2
i
iiiDi
η=Π        
         
(3.54) 
2
))1)((
2ρν kkqqcwqwq jijjiiUi −++−+=Π               (3.55) 
Where inverse demand function pi in the profit function of the downstream firm is: 
ke-eqq-p jijii µβδγα ++−=       
         
(3.56) 
As in the Model I and in most quality and marketing literatures, we have the same 
quadratic cost functions for quality and marketing investments in the profit functions 
of the upstream and downstream firms in order to reflect the diminishing returns to 
investments. On the other hand, upstream firm is subjected to the cost of production 
of one unit shown by “c”.  
In the Model II, quality investment is done only by the upstream monopolist firm, 
which may include more technologic fast, reliable and flexible equipments, software 
packages, organizational trainings etc. Quality and marketing investments have 
impacts on both profit and inverse demand functions. In the profit function, quality 
investment k influences the total cost of the upstream firm first by fixed costs and 
then by variable cost as we see in the equation (3.55). Variable cost is taken as 
 )c(1 kν+ where ν  can be smaller or greater then zero including the production cost 
decline due to the improvement in quality. Marketing investment has only fixed cost 
effect on the profit function of the downstream firms. 
We will analyze the optimal decisions of upstream and downstream firms in four 
stages. At the first stage of our model, upstream monopolist firm determines the 
quality investment level and then in the stage two, upstream merged firm determines 
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the wholesale prices that will be offered to the downstream firms. After 
determination of wholesale prices, we will find the sub-game perfect NE for 
marketing investments of the downstream firms in the third stage. The last stage is 
the downstream firms’ decisions of the output levels in a Cournot fashion knowing 
quality investment, wholesale price and marketing investment levels that have been 
decided in the previous stages. Now we are analyzing these stages one by one.  
3.4.1 Stage 4: Downstream Firms Determine Quantity Levels 
At the forth stage of the second model, each downstream firms determines their 
output level taking the other downstream firm’s output level as given. Therefore, the 
equilibrium quantities that are found at this stage are the function of marketing 
investments decisions (ei and ej) of the downstream firms, wholesale prices (wi and 
wj) and quality investment decision (k) of the upstream firm.  
We expect that the downstream firms’ profit functions are concave in qi and qj. Nash-
Cournot equilibrium quantities are found by maximizing the profit functions of the 
downstream firms and solving the first order conditions and then we obtain following 
equilibrium Cournot quantities: 
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(3.58) 
In order to maintain the concavity and prevent negative selling quantity, we assume 
that 0)(-4 2 ≠+ γ . It means 2≠γ  and 2−≠γ . This condition is already holding 
because we set degree of differentiation as: 10 pp γ . 
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In order to validate the sufficient condition for the concavity, we test the second-
order conditions. We observe that second order conditions are the same in Model I 
and Model II for the order quantity decision and they are directly satisfied: 
2
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(3.59) 
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(3.60) 
Since the profit functions of downstream firms are continuous and concave in qi and 
qj, the first-order conditions provide the profit maximizing level of quantities. We 
test the stability of the qi and qj equilibriums values, again by utilizing Index Theory 
Approach of Cachon and Netessine [6]. The condition for the Index Theory 
Approach for qi and qj is: 
qiqjqjqiqjqi
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(3.61) 
We derive the following condition in the equation (3.62), by applying this condition 
to the profit function of downstream firms for qi and qj: 
-2<γ<2                  (3.62) 
This condition is already satisfied, because while designing the model we admitted 
that, 1>γ>0. As a result qi and qj carried out by the first order conditions are unique 
Nash Equilibriums. 
3.4.1.1 Comparative static analyses on the outcomes of Model II Stage 4: 
When we compare Model I and II, we can say that equilibrium quantities are 
influenced by the upstream merge because of quality investment decision “k” of the 
upstream monopolist firm. In the first model, in the equilibrium quantities 
expression, there are both ki and kj variables, while in the upstream merger case; we 
have only quality investment decision k.  
Effectiveness of the downstream firm’s own marketing investment and competitor 
downstream firm’s marketing investment on the equilibrium quantity levels of Model 
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I and Model II are the same. In both model, if the effectiveness of the competitor 
firm’s marketing investment (β) increases, this will affect negatively the quantity 
decision qi while, increase in the effectiveness of the firm’s own marketing 
investment (δ) results in increase in the order quantity qi. Because: 
0pβ∂
∂ iq  and 0fδ∂
∂ iq
                  
(3.63) 
If we compare the effectiveness of quality investment (µ) on the equilibrium quantity 
levels, we arrive to different results in the models. In Model II, the quantity produced 
by downstream i increases by: 
0
2
fγµ −=∂
∂ kqi
                 
(3.64) 
in response of to an increase in quality investment parameter µ. It means, if the effect 
of quality investment increases, downstream firm increases the quantity decisions. 
Because, we know that k is positive and γ is between 0 and 1. 
Because of the complexity of the derivations, we will conduct the comparative 
statistics analysis for the other exogenous variables with the help of graphics in the 
comparative statistics part of Model II.
 
 
3.4.2 Stage 3: Downstream Firms Determine Marketing Investment  
At the third stage of the game, we determine the Nash equilibrium levels of 
marketing investments of the downstream firms taking the other firm’s marketing 
investment level as given.  
We substitute the expressions of UMiq  disposed by the equations (3.57) and (3.58) 
above into the downstream firms’ profit functions and we obtain the new profit 
functions of downstream firms regarding wholesale prices, quality investment and 
marketing investment levels as follow: 
2
e 
-q )w-(p 
2
iUM
iiiDi
η=Π
                   
(3.65) 
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After maximizing the profit functions of the downstream firms by solving the first 
order conditions according to marketing investment levels of the competing 
downstream firms, we obtain the following reaction functions of the firms: 
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(3.67) 
Once solving these equations simultaneously, we find the equilibrium marketing 
investment levels that maximize the profits of downstream firms as follows: 
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))4()2)(4(4)()2(4(
))(-4-4-(2
))(-4-2-(
))(2(-2
)()2--2(A
23222222
22
22
2
ηγηδβγγδβδβγ
ηγγβδγβ
ηγδβγδ
ηγγ
δβδβγ
+−+−+−−−−=
+=
+=
++=
+=
E
D
C
B
   
(3.70) 
In order to assure the concavity of the marketing investment reaction function and 
not to have negative marketing investment level, we require that  
0≠E           
         
(3.71) 
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Using the second-order derivations of the profit functions in terms of ei and ej, we 
obtain the second order conditions of the profit functions for ei and ej as in the 
equation (3.72):  
0
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The second order conditions for the stage 3 in Model I and II are the same. Under the 
condition (3.72), the profit functions of the downstream firms will be concave in ei 
and ej and the first-order conditions will provide the profit maximizing level of 
marketing investments.  
While testing the stability of the marketing investment decisions of the downstream 
firms by Index Theory Approach of Cachon and Netessine [6], we use the following 
condition for qi and qj: 
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If this condition is satisfied, we can say that there is a unique Nash Equilibrium for ei 
and ej. After applying this stability condition, we reach the following condition: 
222222 ))+4(-) 2-(-2( )+(-2) 2-( 4 ηγδβγγδβδβγ +p    
         
(3.74) 
We can confirm that there is a unique Nash Equilibrium for ei and ej by verifying the 
condition (3.74) above that demonstrates one to one relation between the best 
responses.  
If we impute the ei and ej in the optimum quantities that have been found in stage 4, 
we derive that optimum quantities, which will be sold in the market by the 
downstream firms as: 
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(3.75) 
By replacing ei with the optimum marketing investment level expression UMie  in the 
profit functions of downstream firm i, we derive the profit functions in the equation 
(3.76) in terms of quality investment and wholesale price decisions of upstream firm. 
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Inverse demand functions in terms of quality investments and wholesales price 
decisions of the upstream firm takes the following form after substituting the 
equilibrium values UMie .  
ke-eqq-p UMj
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(3.77) 
3.4.2.1 Comparative static analysis on the outcomes of stage 3  
The impact of the quality investment µ on the marketing investment decision is 
shown in the equation
 
(3.78): 
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(3.78) 
We can affirm that the numerator and denominator of the equation is positive from 
the second order and stability conditions. We know that “0<γ<1”, “β<δ” and “η>0”. 
Therefore, if the impact of quality investment on quantity increases, downstream 
firm i increases the marketing investment level. There is a positive relation between 
marketing investment and quality investment impact µ. 
We can show this relation by substituting the relavant values for the parameters 
regarding the second order and stability conditions, the derivation of the marketing 
investment in terms of µ which are  ν=0, α=50, c=10, δ=0.7, η=0.5, ρ=2.5, β=0.51, 
and we obtain: 
k
eUMj 605.1=∂
∂
µ                   (3.79) 
If we analyze the impact of β, δ, ρ, γ and η, we obtain more complicated derivatives. 
So, we will analyze the impact of these exogenous variables at the end of the Model 
II by substituting relavant values for the parameters regarding the second order and 
stability conditions.  
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3.4.3 Stage 2: Upstream Firm Determines Wholesale Price 
At the second stage of the game, upstream firm determines the wholesale prices for 
the downstream firms. We suppose that there is only one upstream firm and it is the 
monopolist in the market. We also suppose that the upstream monopolist firm sells 
its product to both of the downstream firms.  
We impute the output levels and the marketing investment levels of the downstream 
firms that are found in the previous stages while finding the equilibrium wholesale 
prices.  
We define the profit function of the upstream monopolist firm as:  
2
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(3.80) 
We replace the expressions of UMiq  and 
UM
iq  that we have derived in Stage 3, in 
profit function of upstream monopolist firm. Then we obtain restructured profit 
function in terms of wi, wj, k and the other constants as follow: 
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Maximizing the profit function of the upstream monopolist firm with respect to 
wholesale prices, we obtain the following reaction functions of the firm: 
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(3.84) 
Once solving these equations simultaneously, we find the equilibrium wholesale 
price levels that maximize the profit of upstream firm as follows: 
)ckk(c 1/2 νµα +++=UMiw        
         
(3.85) 
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(3.86) 
As stated above, wholesale price depends on the parameter that shows the impact of 
quality investment on demand µ, market size α, production cost c, variable cost effect 
of the quality investment ν and the quality investment level of the upstream firm. It is 
obvious from the equations (3.85) and (3.86); upstream monopolist firm offers the 
same wholesale prices to the downstream firms.  
In order to assure the concavity of the wholesale price reaction function and not to 
have negative marketing investment level, we require that 0≠C . 
Using the second-order conditions, we want to test whether the profit function is 
concave in wholesale price level (wi and wj) or not.  We see that second order 
conditions are directly satisfied if the expression below is true: 
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In the aim of verifying that wi and wj are the equilibrium points that maximize the 
profit of the upstream monopolist firm, we use the Hessian Matrix [3].  
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In order to assure this condition, E should be smaller than 0. Because 0<γ<1 and 
η>0.  
These two conditions are necessary for the concavity and the uniqueness of the 
solutions. We will define the borders of parameters in order to maintain these 
conditions. The constraints on the parameters are given in the “Model II Conditions” 
part. Consequently, we can admit that the profit function is concave in wi and wj and 
the first-order conditions provide the profit maximizing level of wholesale prices. 
Now, we redefine the equilibrium order quantities, marketing investment levels and 
profits of downstream and upstream firms that have been obtained in the previous 
stages by substituting the equilibrium values of wholesale prices.  
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The profit functions of the upstream and downstream firms are: 
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Please refer to Appendix of the Mathematica results for more detailed expression of 
equilibrium profit, wholesale price, quantity, marketing investment level and inverse 
demand functions. 
3.4.3.1 Comparative static analysis on the outcomes of Stage 2 of Model II  
Comparative static analysis that are derived from the outcomes of stage 2 shows that 
after determination of the equilibrium quality investment k, wholesale price decision 
of the upstream firm doesn’t depend on the degree of differentiation γ, quality 
investment fix cost impact ρ on profit, marketing investments demand parameters β 
and δ, and marketing investment impact on profit η. Because, Nash equilibrium 
levels of wholesale prices in equations (3.85) and (3.86) don’t include these 
parameters in stage 2. 
Hence, wholesale price depends on production cost c, upstream firm’s quality 
investment impact on demand µ, quality investment variable cost impact on profit ν 
and demand potential of the market α and the equilibrium quality investment level k.  
If the quality investment variable cost impact on profit ν increases, wholesale price 
will be affected by: 
2
ckw UMi =∂
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(3.95) 
Due to the positivity of c and k, there is a positive relation between effectiveness of 
quality investment on variable cost and wholesale price. It means, if quality 
investment impact on the variable cost of production increases, wholesale price 
increases.  
When we take the derivative of wi with respect to µ, we find that: 
2
kwUMi =∂
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µ                   
(3.96) 
From the equation (3.96), we conclude that, increase in µ will influence wi depending 
on the quality investment decision of upstream firm. It is evident that there is a 
positive relation between µ and wi because of the positivity condition of k. As a 
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result, if quality investment impact on demand increases, the wholesale prices will 
increase. 
3.4.4 Stage 1: Upstream Firm Determines Quality Investment Level 
At the last stage of the game, the upstream monopolist firm determines the quality 
level that maximizes its profit. As we are using the backwards induction method, we 
determine the equilibrium level of quality investment of the upstream firm using the 
output levels, marketing investment levels and quantity decisions of the firms that 
were found in the previous stage. So, we develop the profit function of the upstream 
monopolist firm by substituting the expression of wholesale price wi and wj that we 
have calculated in the second stage and we obtain the equation in equation (3.93).  
If we maximize the profit function of the upstream firm by solving the first order 
condition according to quality investment level, we derive the following quality 
investment level: 
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In order to assure the concavity and positivity of the quality investment level, we 
require that: 
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Using the second-order derivation of the profit function in terms of k, we test 
whether the profit function is concave in quality investment level k or not. We 
observe that second order condition is directly satisfied if the expression below is 
negative:  
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While determining the intervals for the parameters, we take into account second 
order conditions and select the valid values for the parameters. Consequently, the 
profit function of upstream firm is continuous and concave in k and the first-order 
condition provides the existence of equilibrium at quality investment level. 
We can say by looking at the equation (3.98) that the quality investment decision of 
the upstream firm depends on  
1. Degree of differentitation of the products,  
2. Production cost,  
3. Market demand,  
4. Impact of quality investment on demand,  
5. Variable cost impact of quality investment on profit of upstream firm,  
6. Impact of marketing investment of the downstream firms on demand,  
7. Fix cost impact of marketing investment on the profit of downstream firms, 
8. Fix cost impact of quality investments on the profit of upstream firm.   
The sign and magnitude of these impacts of the parameters on k will be analyzed in 
the “Comparative Statics” part of the Model II.  
Now, we find the optimum levels of equilibrium order quantities, marketing 
investments and wholesale prices by substituting the equilibrium values of k into the 
expressions obtained previously and we have our final results in terms of exogenous 
variables for the Model II. The detailed expressions of these functions are: 
2
222
"4
))(-4-)2-(2()-(c- 
A
UM
Di
ηγδβγηα +=Π
            
(3.101)
 
"
)-(cC"- 
2
A
UM
Ui
ρα=Π
               
(3.102)
 
"
)-(cC"
 
A
q UMi
ρα=
               
(3.103)
 
"
" 
A
BeUMi
ρ=
                
(3.104)
 
55 
 
"2
))2("")(()-()c-c(2C" 
A
CEcw UMi
ργαανµνµ +−−−+−=
           
(3.105)
 
"2
)")1(")(2C"())3(""()(-c2C" 
2
A
ECcCEpUMi
++−+−++−−++= ργανµµργαανµν
   
(3.106) 
Where; 
ρδβδβγ
ηγανµ
ηγ
δβγα
ηργγρδβδβγνµηγ
)()2--2(E"
)(-4)("
)(-4"
)2-)(-("
)2()(-2)()2-(2)()(-4"
2
2
222
−=
+−=
+=
=
+++−−−+=
D
C
cB
cA
 
       
(3.107)
 
As a result, the formal framework and infrastructure of our analysis for Model II is 
completed. 
3.4.5 Conditions on the Model II Parameters 
Because of the complexity of the equilibrium analysis, we will proceed using 
numerical values for the parameters satisfying the second order conditions and 
stability conditions of each stage. We assigned certain values to the exogenous 
variables by taking into account the following conditions: 
α > c; 
0 < γ < 1;         
       
(3.108) 
β < δ 
The values assigned for market size, production cost are indicated in the equation 
(3.109) above. We neglige the variable cost impact of the quality investment on 
profit, so we assign 0 for ν. 
α=50, ν=0, c=10               (3.109) 
Accordingly, we reach the following intervals for the exogenous variables, which we 
want to analyze the impact of on the profits of the firms: 
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-0.18<δ<0.880561; 
If δ=0.7, then 0<µ<1.4067; 
η>0.25517 
If η =0.4, then ρ> 1 .08752            
       
(3.110) 
0.255<β<2.1 
If β=0.51, then ρ>1.08752 
ρ>1.08752 µ2 
3.4.6 Comparative Statics of Model II 
This section discusses several implication of the results derived from the equilibrium 
levels of the Model II. We analyze the impact of the exogenous variables on the 
endogenous variables. First-degree derivatives of optimum levels of the profit 
functions, qi, ei, wi and k with respect to parameters show the effect of changes of 
these parameters on the equilibrium levels. We analyze the sign of these expressions 
in the intervals, which we have derived from the second order conditions and 
stability conditions in the previous section. Due to the complexity of the equilibrium 
decisions and derivations of these equilibrium values with respect to the parameters, 
we choose to prove the propositions with graphs. However, the graphs give us very 
strong evidences supporting the results in the propositions. Our findings are as 
follows: 
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3.4.6.1 Derivative of  UMi
UMUM
i
UM
i
UM
Di
UM
U qkew ,,,,,ΠΠ  with respect to γ, δ, µ, ρ, 
β and η 
The table below presents the comparative statics analysis of the Model II for the 
decisions of the upstream and downstream firms on quality investment, marketing 
investment, wholesale price and quantity.  
Table 3.2: Impact of the exogenous variables on the equilibrium decisions. 
 Exogenous Variables  
γ δ µ ρ β η 
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qi + 
<0.37 
- 
>0.37 
+ 
+ - <1.2 
- 
>1.2 
+ 
- 
ei + + + - - - 
wi + 
<0.37 
- 
>0.37 
+ 
+ - <1.2 
- 
>1.2 
+ 
- 
k + 
<0.37 
- 
>0.37 
+ 
+ - 
<1.2 
- 
>1.2 
+ 
- 
ΠD + 
<0.41 
- 
>0.41 
+ 
+ - <1.13 
- 
>1.13 
+ 
- 
ΠU + 
<0.36 
- 
>0.36 
+ 
+ - 
<1.2 
- 
>1.2 
+ 
- 
 
The Table (3.2) was filled for the Model II according to the sign of the derivation of 
the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables in the rows, which are determined 
in the system with respect to the endogenous variables shown in the columns. As it 
can be seen in the Table (3.2); sign of the certain derivatives of the endogenous 
variables change with the values of the parameters. These critical values are 
indicated in the related cells. 
From the table above, we can conclude that all the endogenous variables changes 
positively with the substitution level without any constraints. This shows that if the 
products of the competing firms are substitutable, downstream firms increase their 
marketing investments and quantity decisions and monopolist upstream firm increase 
its quality investment while increasing the wholesale prices. As a result of these 
increases, the profits of the firms increases. This means, if a company has a 
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competitor who produces nearly homogenous products, upstream and downstream 
firms will increase their profits.  
Due to any improvement in the marketing investment effect on quantity (δ), all the 
equilibrium decision like quantity, marketing investment, quality investment and 
wholesale price will increase if  δ>0.41. However, if the impact of the marketing 
investment on demand is lower than <0.36, except marketing investment, upstream 
monopolist and downstream firms are decreasing their decisions and therefore, their 
profts are decreasing. However, downsteam firms increase their marketing 
investments, whatever the impact of this marketing investment on demand.   
Another conclusion derived from the table (3.1) is that the quality investment impact 
on demand has a positive influence on all the endogenous variables.  
While quality parameter that shows the upstream firm’s profit function impact of the 
quality investment ρ has a negative influence on all the equilibrium levels. It means 
if the impact of the quality investment on upstream monopolist firm’s profit 
increases, upstream monopolist firm decreases its quality investment decisions and 
wholesale prices, downstream firms also decrease their market investments and order 
quantities. Consequently, the profits of the firms decline. 
Effectiveness of the competitor downstream firm’s marketing investment on demand 
has a negative impact on the downstream firms’ marketing investment decision. If 
the effectiveness increases, downstream firms decrease their marketing investments. 
Also, β has a negative impact on all the endogenous variables for its low values. 
If we analyze the fix cost impact of marketing investment η, we conduct that all the 
equilibrium values and profits decrease with an increase in effectiveness of the 
marketing investment on profit. It means when the negative impact of the marketing 
investment on profit increases, downstream firms decrease their marketing 
investments, quantity decisions and upstream firms decrease their quality investment 
anad wholesale price decisions. The profits of the firms are also influenced 
negatively from the increase of this impact. 
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3.5 Model III-Vertical Merge of Downstream and Upstream Firms  
In the third model, an integrated channel, where each upstream firm merges with a 
downstream firm, is analyzed. Therefore, we structure a market having two 
competing chains Mi and Mj as it can be seen in Figure (3.4). There is a duopolistic 
competition between these chains. Vertical mergers compete with each other  in a 
Cournot fashion. Each vertical merged chain’s objective is to maximize their profits 
non-cooperatively with the other vertical chain while choosing their order quantity qi, 
quality investment ki and marketing investment ei levels. This model investigates the 
results of vertical merging and the behavior of the upstream-downstream merged 
firms in the market. In this model, we have used again the backwards induction 
method to find the Nash equilibrium levels.  
We have two chains Mi and Mj in the model as we see in the Figure 3.4 below: 
 
Figure 3.4: Vertical Merge of Downstream and Upstream Firms Case 
The main difference of that model from Model I and II is that there is no wholesale 
price decision as a result of merging. Since, the upstream and downstream firms 
forms a vertical merger, we suppose that the upstream firm in the vertical chain sells 
the input product to the downstream firm from the production cost c. Consequently, 
we find the sub-game perfect Nash equilibriums for ei, ki and qi values.  
We have the following profit functions for each vertical merged firm:  
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(3.111)
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Where inverse demand function pi in the vertical merged firm’s profit function is: 
ijiji
VM
i ke-eqq-p µβδγα ++−=      
       
(3.112) 
In the profit functions, vertical merged firms have three types of cost. They are 
marketing investment ei, quality investment ki and production cost c. The vertical 
merger will carry all the quality investment, marketing investment and production 
costs different from the other Models. Cost function of quality and marketing 
investments is quadratic in order to reflect the diminishing returns to investments as 
in the Model I and II. In the profit function, quality investment ki effects the profit of 
the firm first by fixed costs and then by variable cost as we see in the equation 
(3.111). Variable cost of quality investment is taken as  )c(1 kν+ where ν can be 
smaller or greater then zero including the production cost decline due to the 
improvement in quality. Marketing investment has only fixed cost effect on the profit 
function because marketing effort does not depend on the unit sold. 
In the inverse demand function (3.112), we see the impacts of degree differentitation 
γ, quality µ and marketing investments of competing firms δ and β.  
We will analyze the optimal decisions of vertical merged chains in three stages. At 
the first stage of our model, vertical merged firms determine the quality investment 
levels, in the second stage they decide on the marketing investment. After 
determining the marketing investment levels, vertical merged firms select the output 
levels in the last stage knowing quality and marketing investment levels that have 
been decided in the previous stages. Now we are analyzing these stages one by one 
using backwards induction method. 
3.5.1 Stage 3: Vertical Merger Determines Quantity Levels 
At the third stage of the game, each vertical merger determines their output level 
taking the other chain’s output level as given. The equilibrium quantities that have 
been found at this stage are the function of marketing and quality investment 
decisions.  
Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities are found by maximizing the profit functions of 
the vertical merged firms and solving the first order conditions, than we obtain 
following equilibrium Cournot quantities: 
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(3.114) 
In order to maintain the concavity and prevent negative selling quantities, we assume 
that 0)(-4 2 ≠+ γ . This condition is already satisfied, because while designing the 
model we admitted that, 1>γ>0. 
After taking the second order derivative of the profit functions of vertical merged 
chains with respect to qi and qj, we observe that second order conditions are directly 
satisfied: 
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(3.116) 
Since the profit functions of vertical merged firms are continuous and concave in qi 
and qj, the first-order conditions provide the profit maximizing level of quantities. 
The uniqueness and the stability of the equilibrium quantities is tested utilizing Index 
Theory Approach of Cachon and Netessine [6]. We obtain the following condition in 
equation (3.17) after applying this approach for qi and qj: 
1
4
2
pγ
                
(3.117) 
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It means, qi and qj carried out by the first order conditions are unique Nash 
Equilibriums if and only if 22 pp γ−  which s already hold.  
3.5.1.1 Comparative static analyses on the outcomes of Model III Stage 3: 
In the third model, equilibrium quantities are influenced from the substitution level, 
effectiveness of marketing and quality investments on demand. On the other hand, 
we can say that, after the determination of the investment decisions; the quality and 
marketing investments parameters η and ρ do not have an influence on the quantity 
decisions. Because, the derivations of the equilibrium quantity levels with respect to 
η and ρ are zero: 
0=∂
∂
η
VM
iq
 
And 0=∂
∂
ρ
VM
iq
              
(3.118) 
In the equilibrium quantity level of the Model III, we see the impact of production 
cost c, apart from the other models.  
The equilibrium quantities give the same responses to the changes in β and δ in three 
Models, which depends on the marketing investment decisions and substitution level.    
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(3.119) 
0
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γ
δ −
+=∂
∂ jiVMi eeq         
       
(3.120) 
From these equations, we can conclude that, an increase in β or δ, which shows the 
marketing investment impacts on demand, depend on the substitutability of the 
products and marketing investment decisions of its own and competitor merged 
chain. We can state that the quantity decision of the merged chain i decrease, if the 
impact of marketing investment of the competitor chain on the demand increases. 
Therefore, equation (3.119) is negative. On the other hand, equation (3.120) is 
positive which demonstrates that if the impact of the firm’s own marketing 
investment on the demand increases, firm will increase the order quantity.  
As a response to an increase in the impact of quality investment on demand, the 
quantity produced by vertical merged firm i increase by (3.121) in Model III. 
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(3.121) 
It means that in three of the models, when the impact of quality investment on 
demand increases, the firms increase their quantity decision. Because, we know that 
ki and kj are positive and γ is between 0 and 1. 
If we analyze the impact of γ, we obtain derivatives that are more complicated. 
Subsequently, we will analyze the impact of these exogenous variables with the help 
of graphics at the end of the Model III by substituting relavant values for the 
parameters regarding the second order and stability conditions. 
 
 
3.5.2 Stage 2: Vertical Merger Determines Marketing Investment  
At the second stage of the game, we determine the equilibrium marketing investment 
levels of the vertical merged chains taking the other chain’s marketing investment 
decision as given.  
We substitute the expressions of equilibrium qi in the equation (3.113) and (3.114) 
into the vertical merged chains’ profit functions and we derive the new profit 
function as follow: 
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After maximizing the profit functions of the vertical merged firms by solving the first 
order conditions according to marketing investment levels of the competing chains, 
we obtain the following symmetric reaction functions: 
0=∂
∂
i
Mi
e
π
 
ηγδβγδγβ
γννγγµµγδγαβδβγ
22222
jijj
)(-4-88- 2 
))22(k-2k-e-)(2-)(2e2-( 2 
++
+++++−= jii
kkc
e
            
(3.124) 
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(3.125) 
Once solving these equations simultaneously, we find the equilibrium marketing 
effort levels that maximize the profit of vertical merged firms as follows: 
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In order to assure the concavity of the marketing investment reaction function and 
not to have negative marketing investment levels, we require that  
0≠E           
       
(3.128) 
In the aim of validating concavity of the profit function regarding equilibrium levels 
of ei and ej, second order derivatives of the profit functions of vertical merged chains 
with respect to ei and ej are calculated and the condition in the equation (3.129) is 
obtained: 
0
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This condition is satisfied for the certain values of the parameters, so, the profit 
function is concave in ei and ej and the first-order conditions provide the profit 
maximizing level of marketing investments for these values. 
We are testing the stability of the NE levels of marketing investment by using the 
Index Theory Approach of Cachon and Netessine [6] and we reach the following 
condition:  
222222 )))+(-4) 2-(-2())+(-2)2-(4( ηγδβγγδβδβγ +p   
       
(3.130) 
Verifying this stability condition, we assure the uniqueness of NE for ei and ej. 
If we impute ei and ej in the equilibrium levels that have been found in stage 3, we 
obtain the optimum quantity expression, profit functions and inverse demand 
function in terms of quality investment decisions of the competing vertical merged 
chains. As these values are symmetric, the optimum quantity for the ith vertical 
merged firm is: 
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(3.134) 
Please refer to the Appendix of the Mathematica results for more detailed expression 
of equilibrium quantity decision, profit and inverse demand functions that are written 
in form of quality investment level and the other parameters. 
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3.5.2.1 Comparative static analysis on the outcomes of stage 3  
The derivative of the ei with respect to µ shows that the effectiveness of the quality 
investment on demand influence in the same way the marketing investment decision 
in Model I and Model III which is equal to: 
 ))4()2)(4(4)()2(4(
))4)(2)()(2(2)(-2-( 2
23222222
2
ηγηδβγγδβδβγ
ηγγδβδβγδβγ
µ +−+−+−−−−
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∂ jiijSi kkkke
       
(3.135) 
We can affirm that the numerator and denominator of the equation are positive from 
the second order and stability conditions. Therefore, we can conclude that if the 
effectiveness of the quality investment on demand increases, the vertical merged firm 
increases the marketing investment.  
If we analyze the impact of ρ on the marketing investment decision, we conclude 
that, after the determination of the quality investment, ρ does not have an impact on 
marketing investment decisions. This means, the impact of fixed cost of quality 
investment on profit does not have an influence on marketing investment decision. 
Because; 
0=∂
∂
ρ
VM
ie
                
(3.136) 
If we analyze the impact of β, δ, γ and η, we obtain derivatives that are more 
complicated. So, we will analyze the impact of these exogenous variables at the end 
of the Model III with the help of graphics by substituting relavant values for the 
parameters regarding the second order and stability conditions.  
3.5.3 Stage 1: Vertical Merger Determines Quality Investment Level 
At the last stage of Model III, the vertical mergers determine simultaneously the 
quality investment levels that maximize their profits. As we are using the backwards 
induction method, we determine the equilibrium levels of quality investments taking 
the other chain’s quality investment as given. 
We develop the profit functions of the vertical mergers by substituting the expression 
of equilibrium levels of marketing investments ei and ej that we have derived in the 
second stage. The new expression of the profit function is indicated in the equation 
(3.131).  
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If we maximize the profit function of the vertical merged chain by solving the first 
order condition according to quality investment levels ki and kj: 
0=∂
∂
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k
π
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k
π
              
(3.137) 
We find the equilibrium quality investment levels by solving the reaction functions 
for ki and kj simultaneously in the aim of deriving the equilibrium quality investment 
levels that maximize the profits of vertical merged chains. Because of the complexity 
of expressions, the equilibrium levels of quality investments are put in the Appendix 
of the Mathematica Results. 
Using the second-order conditions, we can find the sufficient condition for the 
solution to be an exact point that maximizes the profit. We see that second order 
conditions are directly satisfied if the expression below is verfied:  
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(3.139) 
While testing the stability of the profit functions in terms of quality investments, 
once more by utilizing Index Theory Approach of Cachon and Netessine [6] in the 
equation (3.140), we obtain the condition that is required for assuring the uniqueness 
of Nash Equilibrium for ki and kj. Please refer to Appendix of the Mathematica 
Results for the Stability condition. 
ij
VMj
ji
VMi
j
VMj
i
VMi
kkkkkk ∂∂
∂
∂∂
∂≥∂
∂
∂
∂ ππππ 22
2
2
2
2
*
)(
*
)(                        
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We choose the parameters regarding the second order and stability conditions, so the 
profit function is concave in ki and kj, the first-order conditions provide the profit 
maximizing level of quality investments and ki and kj are the unique of NE. 
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We impute the equilibrium level of the quality investment decision in the profit 
functions of the vertical merged firms, equilibrium quantity and marketing 
investment decisions. Consequently, we obtain their expressions in terms of 
exogenous variables as in the equations (3.141), (3.142), (3.143) and (3.144). The 
extended form of the equilibrium quantity levels, marketing investment levels, 
inverse demand functions and the profit expressions in terms of the parameters are 
indicated in the Appendix due to deep density of the expressions, please refer to 
Appendix of the Mathematica Results for the detailed expressions of these functions. 
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Finally, the formal framework and infrastructure of our analysis for Model III is 
completed. 
3.5.4 Conditions on the Model III Parameters 
Because of the complexity of the equilibrium analysis, we will proceed using 
numerical values for the parameters satisfying the second order conditions and 
stability conditions of each stage. We assigned certain values to the exogenous 
variables by taking into account the following conditions:  
α > c; 
0 < γ < 1;         
       
(3.145) 
β < δ 
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The values assigned for market size, production cost are indicated in the equation 
(3.146) above. We neglige the variable cost impact of the quality investment on 
profit, so we assign 0 for ν. 
α=50, ν=0, c=10               (3.146) 
Accordingly, we reach the following intervals for the exogenous variables, which we 
want to analyze the impact of on the profits of the firms: 
-0.15<δ<0.880561; 
If δ=0.7, then 0<µ<1.3; 
η>0.46         
ρ> 1.2132675         
       
(3.147) 
0.255< β <2.1  
ρ>1.2724 µ2 
3.5.5 Comparative Statics of Model III 
First-degree derivatives of equilibrium levels of the profit functions of vertical 
merged firms, quantity decisions qi, marketing investment levels ei, and quality 
investment levels ki with respect to parameters show the effect of any change of 
these parameters on the equilibrium levels. We perform our analysis taking into 
account the sign of this expression in the interval where second order conditions and 
stability conditions are hold. We have chosen the values for the parameters in the 
light of these intervals. Due to the complexity of the equilibrium analysis with 
respect to the exogeneous variables, we use graphical analysis, which gives us very 
strong evidences supporting the results given in the following propositions. 
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3.5.5.1 Derivative of VMi
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The table below presents the comparative statics analysis of the Model III for the 
decisions of the vertical merged firms on quality investment, marketing investment 
and quantity.  
Table 3.3: Impact of the exogenous variables on the equilibrium decisions. 
 Exogenous Variables  
γ δ µ ρ β η 
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 qi 
< 0.13 
- 
> 0.13 
+ 
<0.37 
- 
>0.37 
+ 
+ - <1.2 
- 
>1.2 
+ 
- 
ei 
< 0.2 
- 
> 0.2 
+ + + - - - 
ki 
< 0.3 
- 
> 0.3 
+ 
<0.38 
- 
>0.38 
+ 
 
+ - 
<1.27 
- 
>1.27 
+ 
- 
ΠM + 
<0.46 
- 
>0.46 
+ 
+ - <1.1 
- 
>1.1 
+ 
- 
 
The Table (3.3) was filled for the Model III according to the sign of the derivation of 
the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables in the rows, which are determined 
in the system with respect to the endogenous variables shown in the columns. As it 
can be seen in the Table (3.3); sign of the certain derivatives of the endogenous 
variables change with the values of the parameters. The critical values are indicated 
in the related cells. 
From the table above, we can conclude that all the endogenous variables changes 
positively with the substitution level under the condition that the substitutability is 
greater than 0.3. If the degree of differentiation is very high (γ is low), order quantity, 
marketing investment and profits of vertical merged firms influence negatively. This 
shows that if the products of the competing chains are not substitutable, firms 
decrease their marketing investments. Due to the decrease in the marketing 
investments and order quantities, vertical merged firms’ profits decrease. As a result, 
if a company has a competitor who produce nearly homogenous products, vertical 
chains’ profit will increase.  
Due to any improvement in the marketing investment effect on quantity (δ), all the 
equilibrium decision like quantity, marketing investment, quality investment and 
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wholesale price will increase if  δ>0.46. However, if the impact of the marketing 
investment on demand is lower than <0.37, except marketing investment, vertical 
merged chains are decreasing their decisions and consequently, their profits are 
decreasing. However, the vertical merged firms increase their marketing investments, 
whatever the impact of this marketing investment on demand.   
Another conclusion derived from the table (3.3) is that the quality investment impact 
on demand has a positive influence on all the endogenous variables. Quality 
parameter that shows the profit function impact of the quality investment ρ has a 
negative influence on all the equilibrium levels. It means if the impact of the quality 
investment on vertical chains’ profits increase, vertical chains decrease their quality 
investment decisions, market investments and order quantities. Consequently, the 
profits of the firms decline. 
Effectiveness of the competitor downstream firm’s marketing investment on demand 
has a negative impact on the vertical chains’ marketing investment decisions. If the 
effectiveness of the impact increases, vertical merged chains’ decrease their 
marketing investments. Also, β has a negative impact on all the endogenous variables 
for its low values. 
If we analyze the fix cost impact of marketing investment η, we conduct that all the 
equilibrium values and profits decrease with an increase in effectiveness of the 
marketing investment on profit. It means when the negative impact of the marketing 
investment on profit increases, vertical merged chains decrease their marketing 
investments, quantity decisions and quality investment decisions. The profits of the 
firms are also influenced negatively from the increase of this impact. 
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4. COMPARISONS AMONG THREE MODELS 
This section discusses several implication of the results derived in the previous 
sections. In the section 3, we computed the equilibrium quality and marketing 
investment decisions, quantity levels and profit functions of the upstream and 
downstream firms in term of α, c, γ, ρ, η, β, δ, ν and µ for three different models. In 
particular, we focus on product differentiation, profit-effecting parameters of quality 
and marketing investments (η and ρ) and demand-effecting parameters of quality and 
marketing investments (δ, β and µ). Comparing these equilibrium levels and profits 
of upstream and downstream firms, we aim at choosing the best channel structure for 
the upstream and downstream firms among three supply chain structures. In order to 
conduct these analyses, we found the intersection values of the parameters that are 
valid in three models. These values are determined regarding the second order and 
stability conditions. The parameters’ feasible values are indicated in the Table 4.1: 
Table 4.1: Valid Intervals for the Parameters 
Parameters Model I Model II Model III Intersection 
δ -0.15<δ<0.881 0.18<δ<0.881 -0.3< δ <0.881 0.18<δ<0.881 
η η>0.46 η>0.255 η > 0.255 η>0.46 
ρ ρ> 1.21 ρ> 1 .1 ρ >  2.15 ρ> 2.15 
β 0.255< β <2.1 0.255<β<2.1 0.5 < β < 2.1 0.5 < β < 2.1 
γ 0 < γ < 1 0 < γ < 1 0 < γ < 1 0 < γ < 1 
µ 0<µ<1.3 0<µ<1.41 0<µ<2 0<µ<1.3 
 
In order to differentiate the values of three models we used symbols. The 
endogenous variables in Model 1 are labeled with “1”; for Model II, variables are 
labeled with “2” and the variables are labeled with “3”. 
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Due to the complexity of the equilibrium level functions, we cannot give an algebraic 
proof for the propositions. We use the graph method while giving the proofs.  
4.1 Impact of Product Differentiation on the Equilibrium Levels 
In this section, we investigate the impact of product differentiation on the 
equilibrium order quantity, marketing investment, wholesale price, quality 
investment and profits for three models.  
Proposition 4.1a: Without depending on whether or not and how firms merge in 
supply chain, both marketing investment and quality investment levels increases with 
substitution level.    
Proposition 4.1b: For all levels of degree of differentiation marketing investment 
and quality investment are highest in the case of vertical merger. 
Proposition 4.1c: If degree of differentiation is sufficiently low, (γ is high) 
marketing investment level is higher in the case of horizontal merger compared to the 
case with no merger. 
Graphical Demonstration: Graphical representations in the Figure (4.1) and (4.2) 
show the change of the quality and marketing investment levels with substitution 
level. According to the results conducted from the figure, we realize that the 
equilibrium quality and marketing investment levels increase in Model I and Model 
II if the degree of differentiation is low, in other words if the substitutability of the 
products is high. Except for the low values of the substitution level of the products, 
the quality and marketing investment decisions of the vertical merged firms decrease. 
Thus, we can say that, for sufficiently high values of γ, augmentation of γ leads to 
increase in marketing and quality investment decisions in all models as we can see 
from the Figures (4.1) and (4.2). As a result, no matter what the model is, the relation 
between degree of differentiation and the investment decisions is important. The 
firms invest more in quality and marketing investment if there is a high competition, 
it means if the products of the competing firms are highly substitutable. This result 
demonstrates that, if the supply chain members decide to merge vertically, they 
choose to take higher investment decisions.   
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A further finding from the Figures  (4.1) and (4.2) is that, the substitution level 
causes low impact on the investment levels in Model 1 where as it has the highest 
impact on the investment decisions in the Model III. The graph of the marketing 
investment in the model III is higher then the other models for every values of the 
substitution level. This result demonstrates that, if the supply chain merges like in the 
Model III, the chain makes higher investment decisions. We can say that the vertical 
merging encourages the investment decisions. 
If we compare the investment decisions for Model I and II, after certain values of the 
substitution level, we see in the Figure (4.1) that the graph of the marketing 
investment in Model II gets higher than the investment decision in the Model I. This 
means, if the upstream firms merge, the downstream firms decision concerning the 
market investment increases. Because, they are supplying their raw material from the 
same firm, that is upstream horizontal merged firm, so they put more effort on 
marketing investment in order to compete.   
 
Figure 4.1: Marketing Investment Level Change with γ in Three Models 
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium Quality Investment Level in Three Models 
Proposition 4.2: For all levels of degree of differentiation, output levels are highest 
and thus prices are lowest in the case of vertical merger.   
Graphical Demonstration: Figure (4.3) shows the change of the order quantity for 
different values of the degree of differentiation. If we compare the quantity decisions 
in all the models in this graph, we drive the conclusion that in vertical merging case, 
the firms’ decisions on the quantity level is higher then the other two models. This 
shows that in vertical merging case, firms put more products in the market so the 
prices decrease in the final goods market. Therefore, these kinds of markets are more 
competitive.  
 
Figure 4.3: Equilibrium Quantity Levels Change with γ in Three Models 
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In addition, from the figure (4.3) we can conclude that, in the separate case Model I, 
the firms are acting more prudent and do not change the order quantity very much. 
Thus, the graph of the Model I is under the other merging models. 
Proposition 4.3: Wholesale prices are highest in the case of horizontal merger  
Graphical Demonstration: From the figure (4.4), it is apparent that for all the 
values of the substitution level, graph of the wholesale price in the Model II, is 
higher then the other models’ graphs. This shows us that the proposition is verified 
for all γ. Because we have a monopolist upstream firm who determines the wholesale 
prices. Anyhow, in model III, the firms do not choose a wholesale price, because in 
that model, wholesale price is equal to the production cost c. The monopolist power 
of the upstream firms gives rise to the wholesale prices and the rising increases with 
an increase in the substitution level of the competing downstream firms’ products.   
 
Figure 4.4: Equilibrium Wholesale Price Change with γ in Three Models 
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Proposition 4.4: Total profits1 are highest under the vertical merger if degree of 
differentiation is sufficiently low.  
Graphical Demonstration: We can explain this proposition by utilizing the Figure 
(4.5). Dominance of the models in terms of profitability is changing according to the 
substitutability level as it is seen in the figure. We can say that, for the low values of 
the substitution, Model II where the upstream firms merge between each other is 
more profitable than the other Models. On the other hand, Model III is causing a 
deficit for the firms if the substitution level is low. However, under a specific value 
of degree of differentiation, Model III passes beyond the other models and become 
the most profitable supply chain structure for the members. This shows that the 
vertical merging is more profitable than the horizontal merge of the upstream firms 
after a specific value of γ. For the high level of degree of differentiation, Model II, it 
means horizontal merge of the upstream firms is more profitable. The chain 
structure, which results with the lowest profit, is the separate firms’ case. As a result, 
we can say that if the firms are competing with a firm who produces nearly 
homogenous products, it is recommended that the upstream and downstream firms 
merge, on the other hand if the degree of differentiation is high enough; systems total 
profit will be high under upstream firm’s merger. 
 
Figure 4.5: Change of Supply Chain’s Total Profit with γ in Three Models 
                                                 
1 Total profit of the system is obtained by summing up one upsteam and one downstream firm profits. 
This means: Π1= ΠDiS+ ΠUiS;   Π2= ΠDiUM+ ΠUUM/2 and Π3= ΠMiVM. Because, it is assumed that the 
upstream merged firms share the profit equally. 
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Proposition 4.52: Upstream firms always benefit from horizontal merger, but 
downstream firms benefits when the degree of differentiation is sufficiently low. 
Graphical Demonstration: From Figure (4.6), we see the profits of the upstream 
firms of Model I and Model II. Upstream firms profit is higher for all values of γ in 
Model II than in Model I. As the upstream firm is monopolist, they will benefit from 
the merging decision. However, downstream firm’s profit is more robust to the 
substitutability level and start to get by the profit of the upstream firm’s profit of the 
Model II after certain values of γ as we can see in the Figure (4.7). For the high 
values of γ, downstream profit is very aggressive in Model II. The profits of the 
upstream and downstream firms separately are higher in Model II than Model I. 
Upstream firms will increase their profit if they choose to merge with their 
competitor. Other words, cooperation is more profitable for the upstream firms for all 
substitution levels. Downstream will benefit from the merger of the upstream firms 
and increase their profit if their products have very light differentiation. 
 
Figure 4.6: Change of the Profit of Upstream Firms with γ in Model I and II 
                                                 
2 In order to compare the profits of upstream firms in Model I and Model II, it is assumed that in the 
Model II two upstream firms share the profit equally. So we divide the profit of the upstream 
monopolist firm by 2.  
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Figure 4.7: Change of Downstream Firm’s Profit with γ in Model I and II 
4.2 Impact of η and ρ on the Equilibrium Levels 
Proposition 4.6: Marketing and quality investments decrease if the fix cost impact of 
the marketing and quality investments on the profit functions increases whatever the 
supply chain structure. 
Graphical Demonstration: To analyze the above proposition, we look at the 
relation between impact of quality and marketing investment on profit and the 
investment decisions. In the Figures (4.8) and (4.9), we draw the change of 
marketing and quality investment decision with η and ρ in order to monitor the 
impact of these parameters on the investment decisions. By the regressive increases 
of ρ and η, the investment decisions of the firms decrease in three supply chain 
structures as we can see from the Figures (4.8) and (4.9). 
If we compare the change of the marketing investment with η and with ρ, we realize 
the impact of η is higher on the marketing investment decision than ρ. This is 
opposite, if we compare the quality investment change in the Figure (4.9). On the 
quality investment decision, ρ has a higher impact. We conclude that from the slope 
of the graphs. The change in the marketing investment decision with η is higher than 
the change in the marketing investment decision with ρ. However, the change in the 
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quality investment decision with ρ is higher than the change in the quality investment 
decision with η.                    
Marketing investment levels and quality investment levels in the models depends on 
their fix cost impact on profit. If their impacts on the profit are low, then firms will 
invest more on marketing and quality in three of the supply chain structures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Change of Marketing Investment with ρ and η in Three Models 
Figure 4.9: Change of Quality Investment with ρ and η in Three Models 
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Proposition 4.7a: Downstream firms decrease the order quantities that they drive to 
the market when impact of the investment decisions on the profit is high.  
Proposition 4.7b: When the vertically related firms in a supply chain are acting 
cooperatively, the quantity level is even higher if the investment effect on the profit 
is high.   
Graphical Demonstration: If we compare the quantity decisions in all the models 
by using the Figure (4.10), we drive the conclusion that the quantity decision is 
higher when the impact is low, and it is lower when the impact is high whatever the 
supply chains structure. This is means, if the investments’ impacts increase, firms 
will put less products into the market. This may cause to increase in prices. However, 
if the supply chain structure is vertical merger, market will be more saturated in 
terms of product than the other cases; because the product quantity in the market will 
be higher. Related to the high product quantity, price will be lower even the fixed 
cost impacts of the investment decisions are high.     
In addition, from the figure (4.10), we can conclude that, in the separate case Model 
I, the firms are acting more prudent. Hence, the quantity level is under the other 
different merging models and it is not changing a lot when the fix cost impact of the 
investments on the profit gets higher.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Change of Quantity Decision with ρ and η in Three Models 
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Proposition 4.8: If there is a monopolist firm, who determines the price in the 
supply chain, this equilibrium price will get higher than absence of a monopolistic 
firm even the impact of the investment effect is high. 
Graphical Demonstration: We can analyze this proposition by comparing Model II, 
which includes a monopolist upstream merger, with the two other models, which do 
not include any monopoly.  From the Figure (4.11), it is apparent that for all the 
values of the quality and marketing impacts on the profit, graph of the wholesale 
price in the Model II, is higher then the other models’ graphs. Because we a 
monopolist upstream firm who determines the wholesale prices. This shows us that 
the proposition is verified for all ρ and η. In the figures, wholesale prices of the 
models are not changing a lot with the increase of the investment impact. Anyhow, in 
model III, the firms do not choose a wholesale price, because in that model, 
wholesale price is equal to the production cost c. 
 
 
 
Proposition 4.93: For every level of the investment impact on the profit, merging is 
more profitable for the whole supply chain. 
Graphical Demonstration: We can explain this proposition by utilizing the Figure 
(4.12). Dominance order of the models in terms of profitability is not changing 
                                                 
3 Total profit of the system is obtained by summing up one upsteam and one downstream firm profits. 
This means: Π1= ΠDiS+ ΠUiS;   Π2= ΠDiUM+ ΠUUM/2 and Π3= ΠMiVM. Because, it is assumed that the 
upstream merged firms share the profit equally. 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Change Wholesale Price with ρ and η in Three Models 
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according to the fix cost impact of investment on profit. For the all values of η and ρ, 
Model III where the upstream and downstream firms form a merging between each 
other is more profitable than the other Models. In the Figure (4.12), Model III passes 
beyond the other models and become the most profitable supply chain structure for 
the members. This results that the vertical merging is more profitable than the 
horizontal merge of the upstream firms for all values of ρ and η. However, for the 
high values of the ρ where η=0.5, profitability of the horizontal merge and vertical 
merge starts to get closer. The chain structure, which results with the lowest profit, is 
the separate firms’ case for all values of the η and ρ. So, if the quality or marketing 
investment impacts are very high, it is recommended to the firms to merge vertically. 
In the graphs, we see that the profit of the system influenced more from the increase 
in the marketing impact, but this is because of our assumption that the quality 
investment effect is higher than the marketing investment impact on profit and as a 
result, we assign a higher value to the quality investment parameter.   
 
 
 
Proposition 4.104,5: The profits of the upstream and downstream firms separately are 
higher in Model II than Model I for all levels of the investment effects on profit.  
Graphical Demonstration: From Figure (4.13) and (4.14), we see the profits of the 
upstream firms in model I and Model II. Upstream firms’ profit functions are 
                                                 
4 In order to compare the profits of upstream firms in Model I and Model II, it is assumed that in the 
Model II two upstream firms share the profit equally. So we divide the profit of the upstream 
monopolist firm by 2.  
 
5In Model III, because of the merging of upstreams and downstreams, we can not separate the total 
profit. Also, we can not assume that they share the total profit equally due to the different profit 
functions of upstream and downstram firms. So we excluded the Model III for this propostion.   
Figure 4.12: Change of System Total Profit with ρ and η in Three Models 
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decreasing for high values of η and ρ in both Models. However, the profit curve of 
the Model II is over the profit curve of Model I. This demonstrates the proposition, 
which is indicated above. In addition, we can say by looking at the graph that, Profit 
function of upstream firms gets more sensitive to ρ in Model II because the quality 
investment is done by monopolist upstream firm in Model II and this directly affects 
the profit. Other words, cooperation is more profitable for the upstream firms for all 
impact level of investment decisions on profit. Upstream firms will increase their 
profit if they choose to merge with their competitor even if the investment impact on 
the profit is high.  However, the profits of the firms will decrease because of an 
increase of the impact of an increase on the investment impact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Change of Upstream Firm Profit with η and ρ in three Models 
Figure 4.14: Change of Downstream Firms Profit with η and ρ in Three Models 
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4.3 Impact of δ, β and µ on the Equilibrium Levels 
Proposition 4.11: Regardless of the supply chain structure, demand effect of 
marketing investment and quality investment influence in the same manner and 
positively the equilibrium decisions of the firms. 
Graphical Demonstration: The following figures (4.15), (4.16), (4.17) and (4.18) 
shows the change of the marketing investment, order quantity, wholesale price and 
quality investment decisions with an increase in the effectiveness of the marketing 
and quality investments on demand. As we see in the figures, these decisions are 
increasing due to an increase in the effectiveness of the marketing and quality 
investments on demand in all of models. Even if the firms merge vertically or 
horizontally or they stay separately, if they know that the impact of the marketing or 
quality investment on demand is high, they will increase the marketing investments 
and quality investment, which will trigger the increasing of the demand as a result 
increase in the order quantity. 
Except the wholesale price, all the other equilibrium levels as marketing investment, 
quality investment and order quantity is highest in the vertical merging case for all 
impact levels of marketing and quality investment on demand.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Change of Marketing Investment with δ and µ in Three Models 
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Figure 4.16: Change of Order Quantity with δ and µ in Three Models 
Figure 4.17: Change of Wholesale Price with δ and µ in Three Models 
Figure 4.18: Change of Quality Investment with δ and µ in Three Models 
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Proposition 4.12: Increase in the impact of marketing and quality investments after a 
point increases the supply chains total profit and increase the upstream and 
downstream firms’ own profits separately whatever the channel structure is.    
Graphical Demonstration: Figures (4.19), (4.20) and (4.21), are showing the 
change of the supply chains’ total profits, upstream firms and downstream firms’ 
profits regarding to marketing and quality investment impact on demand. For 
sufficiently high values of δ and µ, all of these profits are increasing as we see in the 
figures below. It is more profitable for the firms to merge vertically if the impact of 
quality and marketing investments on demand increases.   
On the other hand, when we look at the figure (4.21), we realize that the profit of the 
downstream firm decrease for the very low values of δ. It means, if the impact of 
marketing investment on demand is low, downstream firm will not meet the 
marketing investment cost, so its profit will decrease. Nevertheless, if the impact of 
marketing investment on demand increases, downstream firms will start to increase 
its profit due to the increasing demand. If we analyze the upstream firm’s profit, it 
constantly increases with the increase in the impact of quality investment on demand, 
even when the impact of the quality investment is low.               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.19: Change of System Total Profit with δ and µ in Three Models 
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Proposition 4.13: If the impact of marketing effort of the competitor firm on 
demand increases, firms decrease their marketing investments. 
Graphical Demonstration: In the figure (4.22), the marketing investment function 
is declining with the increasing of β in three of the models. In the figure, it is seen 
that the marketing investment reaches to zero for high impact of the competitor 
firm’s marketing investment on demand. It means, firms discontinue investing in 
marketing and they stop to compete in terms of marketing in three of the models. The 
reason of the decrease is left to be analyzed in the future researches. Beause, in real 
life, it is expected that the firms continue to compete in terms of marketing 
investments even β is high.  
Figure 4.20: Change of Upstream Profit with δ and µ in Model I and II 
Figure 4.21: Change of Downstream Profit with δ and µ in Model I and II 
 90
 
Figure 4.22: Change of Marketing Investment with β in Three Models 
Proposition 4.14: Quality investment decision and quantity decision influence in the 
same manner from the impact of marketing effort of the competitor firm on demand.  
Graphical Demonstration: In the figures (4.23) and (4.24), the quality investment 
and order quantity functions are changing in the same direction with the increasing of 
β in three of the models. In these figures, we see a small decline in the quality 
investments and order quantities of the firms for specific values of β, which are very 
low. It means, firms decrease their quality investments and quantity decision if the 
marketing investment of the competitor firm affects slightly the product demand. 
But, if the impact gets higher then this specific value, they again start to increase 
order quantities and quality investments. 
 
Figure 4.23: Change of Order Quantity with β in Three Models 
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Figure 4.24: Change of Quality Investment with β in Three Models 
Proposition 4.15: Wholesale price is not influenced a lot from the effectiveness of 
the competitor firm’s marketing investment on demand.  
Graphical Demonstration: In the figure (4.25), we see that the wholesale price 
function is almost constant on the horizontal axis wise in all the models. This 
demonstrates us that the marketing investment impact of the competitor firm on the 
product demand does not affect the wholesale price especially in Model I and Model 
III. However, we realize a very slight decrease in the Model II for the low values of 
β. This can be because of the monopolist upstream firm. As the downstream firms 
decreases their quantity orders for low values of β, the upstream firm have to 
decrease its wholesale price in order to increase its sales.  
 
Figure 4.25: Change of Wholesale Price with β in Three Models 
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Proposition 4.16: The supply chain’s total profit depends on the effectiveness of the 
competitor firm’s marketing investment on demand because; downstream firms’ 
profit starts to increase if this marketing investment effect on demand is sufficiently 
high.  
Graphical Demonstration: In the Figures (4.26), we see that, downstream firm’s 
profit graph forms a convex structure with the increasing β. This denotes that the 
downstream firm will benefit from the marketing investment of the competitor. As 
we see in the Figure (4.23), the order quantity decision of the firms also increases if β 
is high, if order quantity increases, downstream will demand more impute from the 
upstream firms, which in conclusion increases the downstream profit in addition, 
supply chain’s total profit. So, the profit of the upstream and downstream firms 
increase for the high impact of competitor firm’s marketing investment on demand as 
it is seen in the figure (4.27) and (4.28). In Model II, as we have one upstream 
monopolist firm, this firm will increase its profit for all values of β. Since, this firm is 
selling products to both of the downstream firms.  
We also see in the graphs that, the systems total profit is the highest in the vertical 
merger case. It is evident that whatever the competitor’s marketing investment 
impact on demand high or low, total supply chain will be more profitable in case or 
vertical merging of upstream and downstream firms.  
 
 
Figure 4.26: Change of System Total Profit with β in Three Models 
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Figure 4.27: Change of Upstream Firm’s Profit with β in Model I and II 
 
Figure 4.28: Change of Downstream Firm’s Profit with β in Model I and II 
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5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The major purpose of this research was to analyze the different supply chain 
structures while giving multiple decisions.  In this dissertation, we have applied 
game theory to analyze the decision criteria in supply chain management. An 
understanding of the ways in which conflicting objectives affect optimal decisions 
can greatly improve the performance of a supply chain. We extend the exiting 
literature by considering multiple competitive firms, each of which makes multiple 
decisions simultaneously.  
Firstly, we aimed at analyzing the effect of substitutability level of the products, 
impact of marketing and quality investment on profits for three different supply 
chain structures. Secondly, we examined the influence of merging decision of the 
upstream and downstream firms on the supply chains profits and equilibrium 
decisions by comparing three different supply chain structures.  
In three of the models, the competition between downstream firms is for the supply 
of product, marketing investments and quality investment. Upstream firms compete 
based on wholesale price and quality investment, while downstream firms are 
competing for the demand and marketing investments. We analyzed these systems in 
which firms face a linear demand function. In all the models, we derived the 
existence and uniqueness conditions of a Nash equilibrium solution. In addition, we 
performed analysis on the equilibrium decisions with respect to substitutability level 
and exogenous variables. 
In Chapter 3, we began by analyzing a two-upstream and two-downstream 
distribution system with general cost structure. In the first model, we supposed that 
the firms are acting in the market separately. Initially, upstream firms decide 
simultaneously on quality investment, and wholesale prices and then downstream 
firms set simultaneously the market investment level, which is followed by the 
quantity level decisions. 
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Model II, analyzed in Chapter 3.2, considers the merging of two upstream firms. The 
upstream firm acts as a monopolist firm and decides on the quality investment and 
wholesale prices and then downstream firms set their marketing investments and 
quantity levels. 
In Model III, explained in Chapter 3.3, we analyzed the case when two supply chains 
(merger of upstream and downstream firms) compete on the quality investment, 
marketing investments and quantity levels. 
From the comparative statics at the end of each model and from the comparison 
between three models in chapter 4, we derived the following main conclusion:  
Firstly, we conclude that, when the substitutability of the competing firms’ product is 
high, profit of the total supply chain will be higher in the vertical merge of the 
upstream and downstream firms. Our model shows that high substitutability rates in 
all the supply chain structure will corresponds to more benefit for the firms. 
Oppositely, if the substitutability level is very low, the upstream and downstream 
firms will not choose to merge vertically. In this case, the most profitable supply 
chain structure is the horizontal merge of the upstream firms. Downstream firms also 
support this merging of the upstream firms because of the increase in their profits.     
Secondly, we arrive that, when the competitor of the firm is stronger in the marketing 
activities, this will affect negatively the profit of the firm. In this case, supply chain 
members choose to form a vertical merge as in the Model III or horizontal merge as 
in the Model II. For the upstream and downstream firms, merging decision is more 
profitable when the competitor is more powerful in marketing activities.  
Effectiveness of the competitor firm’s marketing investment on demand has also 
negative impact on the firms’ marketing investment decisions. If the effectiveness 
increases, firms decrease their quality investments, quantity decision and marketing 
investments. However, wholesale price is not influenced a lot from the effectiveness 
of the competitor firm’s marketing investment on demand. In addition, the supply 
chain’s total profit depends on the effectiveness of the competitor firm’s marketing 
investment on demand because; downstream firms’ profit starts to increase if this 
marketing investment effect on demand is sufficiently high. It is evident that 
whatever the competitor’s marketing investment impact on demand high or low, total 
supply chain will be more profitable in case or vertical merging of upstream and 
downstream firms. 
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The third conclusion is that if the quality impact on demand is high, the supply chain 
structure of whether horizontal merge of upstream firms or vertical merge of 
upstream and downstream firms will be very profitable. Therefore, the firms will 
choose to merge if the quality impact on the demand is high. 
Another result that we concluded from the analysis is that the prices are higher if 
there is a monopolistic leader in the supply chain. Because, the wholesale prices in 
the Model II, where there is an upstream monopolist firm in the supply chain, are 
higher than the other supply chain structures. 
In addition, we can say that, without depending on whether or not and how firms 
merge in supply chain, both marketing investment and quality investment levels 
increases with substitution level and they reach to the highest levels in the case of 
vertical merger. In case of merging of the upstream and downstream firms, output 
levels are highest and thus prices are lowest then the other models. This derives the 
increase in the profits of the firms in case of vertical merge. The profit is higher even 
if the marketing and quality investment impacts on the profit increases. Regardless of 
the supply chain structure, demand effect of marketing investment and quality 
investment influence positively the equilibrium decisions of the firms. But, 
marketing and quality investments decrease if the fix cost impact of the marketing 
and quality investments on the profit functions increases. 
As a result, we can say that vertical merging of the upstream and downstream firms 
is more profitable in terms of the system total profit. The quality and marketing 
investment decisions and order quantities reaches to the highest level in the vertical 
merger case. As a consequent, of the increase in the order quantity, market prices are 
decreasing.  
5.1 Directions for Further Work 
A potential topic for future research is to extend the two-upstream and two 
downstream supply chain models studied in Chapter 3 of this dissertation to n-
downstream models.  
We can extend this study by addition a bargaining variable between the upstream and 
downstream firms or between the two upstream firms. This will provide us 
determining the profits of the upstream and downstream firms separately. 
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For the demand analyzed in this dissertation, the demand at downstream firms is 
exogenous. A potential avenue of research is to study the case in which the demands 
are affected by the quality of service, such as the percentage of demand satisfied, or 
by selling prices. It would also be interesting to analyze the case when the 
probabilities of customer shifting. 
In Chapter 4, we designed a channel coordination mechanism through wholesale 
prices, quantities and investment levels to optimize the performance of the supply 
chain. Beyond these contracts used, a potential topic is to explore other contracts that 
are designed to improve the performance of a supply chain. Such contracts might 
include the sharing the costs of marketing investments by the upstream and 
downstream firms. 
Another possible extension would be to consider the production capacity of the 
upstream and downstream firms. In our dissertation, we considered that all the 
demand would be covered. But it is not a usual case in reality. 
Our other assumption is that each downstream firm will buy from one upstream firm. 
A more complicated study can be performed by letting trade downstream firms with 
all upstream firms.   
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CD) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104
 105
CURRICULUM VITAE  
Candidate’s full name: Duygu ÖZKAN  
Place and date of birth: Lüleburgaz – 02.01.1982  
Permanent Address: İbrahim Çavuş Mah. Şeyh Celal Sok. No:13/9 Fatih  Istanbul
  
Universities and Colleges attended:   
• Master of Science, Management Engineering, Istanbul Technical University, 
2008. 
• Bachelor of Science, Industrial Engineering, Galatasaray University, 2005. 
• High School, Istanbul Ataturk High School of Science, Istanbul, 2000.  
 
 
